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FREEDOM TO HACK
Ido Kilovaty1
Abstract
The proliferation of Internet-connected smart devices (the “Internet of
Things”) has become a major threat to privacy, user security, Internet
security, and even national security. These threats are manifestations of
externalities primarily resulting from a market failure in the Internet of
Things industry, in which vendors do not have an incentive to implement
reasonable security in the software embedded in devices they produce,
thus creating cheap and unsecure devices. This Article argues that law
and policy have a central role to play in making this digital ecosystem
more secure – not only through direct regulation of this industry, but
primarily through allowing individual security researchers to hack for
security – or “ethical hacking.” At present, laws that prohibit hacking,
such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act, are adopting a strict liability approach to hacking, which
criminalizes almost any form of hacking, regardless of motivation or
potential benefits. This Article rejects this outdated approach in the wake
of ubiquitous cyber-attacks, imperfect software, and the emerging Internet
of Things ecosystem.
This Article argues that law and regulatory agencies should accommodate
hacking for security purposes to allow security researchers to discover
possible vulnerabilities while shielding them from copyright infringement
or criminal liabilities. While security research into software and hardware
is desirable, the law by and large restricts such research. This results in a
reality of highly unsecure Internet-of-Things devices and could potentially
lead to serious harms to security and privacy. Such a legal
accommodation should be supported by other legal adaptations, mainly
involving regulatory oversight and enforcement, consistent rules for
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INTRODUCTION

Everyday devices and appliances are becoming more
sophisticated, computerized, and software-backed. Cars,
thermostats, door locks, smart watches, and even toasters are now
powered by code and connected to the Internet, which offers a
variety of online features that allow users to remotely monitor and
control their devices. These objects are collectively referred to as the
“Internet of Things” (IoT) to denote that Internet is no longer
exclusively a platform for people to communicate with each other;
it is now also a network for “things” to communicate amongst
themselves and at times to collect and transmit user data to
corporations and state authorities.2
The proliferation of IoT devices in personal, business, and
public environments is part of a technological shift from hardware
to software.3 Physical objects are being supplemented, and even
replaced, by software.4 By 2020, it is expected that IoT will reach as
many as 20 billion connected devices, compared to 8 billion today,5
with other estimates extending to as much as 50 billion devices.6
The future worth of the IoT industry is also estimated in the
hundreds of billions of dollars should its trajectory remain as
projected.7 This shift is preceded by a phenomenon of embedding
processors into everyday “things.” In the past, this would have been
immensely expensive and inefficient, whereas today,
microprocessors are widely available and affordable, and Internet

2

See Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Feb.
1,
2017)
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html (arguing
that data collected about us and the things we do is available to both corporations
and governments).
3

Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software,
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1673 (2016).
4

Id.

5

See Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31
Percent
From
2016,
GARTNER
(Feb.
7,
2017)
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917.
INTERNET OF THINGS – PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC
STAFF REPORT i (Jan. 2015).
6

7

Swaroop Poudel, Internet of Things: Underlying Technologies, Interoperability,
and Threats to Privacy and Security, 31(2) BERK. TECH. L. J. 997, 1009 (2016).
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speeds are constantly increasing, meaning that it is easier to
manufacture “smart” objects that operate smoothly. 8
Software, however, is not the only emerging technological
feature in everyday objects. The uniqueness of IoT is its Internet
connectivity, which makes it part of the global network grid, with
all the pertaining conveniences and dangers.9 The IoT trend will
most likely continue to grow and pose serious challenges in the
future, both legally and technically. Some argue that the IoT
development may signal “the end of ownership,”10 since copyright
may stifle any modification to the software of these devices, but
copyright law is also in a way a form of information censorship.11
However, I argue that unless a broad freedom to hack these
devices for security purposes is recognized, at least until regulatory
agencies catch up, IoT technology could also be the end of security

8

See BROADBAND COMMISSION FOR DIGITAL DEVELOPMENT, BROADBAND
DRIVES
THE
INTERNET
OF
THINGS,
http://www.broadbandcommission.org/Documents/Media%20Corner%20Files%
20and%20pdfs/Broadband%20drives%20the%20Internet%20of%20Things.pdf
(“Broadband represents the vital final piece of the puzzle. The need for alwayson bandwidth combined with potentially huge numbers of networked objects –
some estimate many billion individually connected devices – imply an immense
data throughput on networks”). See also LOPEZ RESEARCH, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNET OF THINGS (IOT)
2 (Nov. 2013), available at
http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/solutions/trends/iot/introduction_to_IoT_no
vember.pdf (identifying the many features of today’s tech world allowing the
proliferation of IoT: IPv6, battery life, decreased cost of wireless networks, and
broadband speeds).
See Maria Farrell, The Internet of Things – Who Wins, Who Loses? GUARDIAN
(Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/14/internetof-things-winners-and-losers-privacy-autonomy-capitalism [“With its insecure
devices with multiple points of data access, user applications that routinely
exfiltrate our sensor data, activity logs and personal contacts, and a Sisyphean
uphill struggle required to exert any control over who knows what about us, the
Internet of things does more than create whole new cyber-security attack surfaces.
It is so riddled with metastasising points of vulnerability that you begin to sense
that these are not bugs, but features.”]
9

10

See Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 563, 589
(2016) (quoting AARON PERZANOWSKI & JASON SCHULTZ, THE END OF
OWNERSHIP (2016)).
11

See Susan Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of
Ideas and Data be Criminalized? 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 101, 348–56 (2003).
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and privacy, broadly speaking.12 This is particularly true considering
that the complexities of IoT software will necessarily mean tradeoffs
in terms of security, and vendors creating complex IoT software will
have to test it for every possible attack or compromise, which is
essentially impossible.13 Even if it were possible, experts argue that
software engineers cannot predict future methods of attack,14 and
software testing would also not solve the social engineering threat
that targets the unwitting cooperation of users,15 which involves
“opening an infected file, clicking on a malicious hyperlink, sending
personal information to a phishing Web site, or manually adjusting
security settings.”16 However, it is still believed that the vast
majority of security breaches are caused by flaws in software.17
While embedding access to the global network within ordinary
objects offers many advantages – it makes devices more dynamic,
customizable, user-friendly (to an extent), and, generally, smarter –
it also poses a series of security challenges that, if they remain
unaddressed, may represent actual threats to the “digital order” in
the form of rampant security breaches and privacy violations.
The major problem with today’s unsecure IoT environment is
that it is largely a result of a market failure. The market failure
manifests itself in multiple ways. First, the industry is not legally
bound by any particular guidelines on security and privacy; a sizable
number of devices are therefore unsecure, offering an opportunity
for criminals and other exploiters to commit malicious cyber-attacks
against innocent users. This could even go further; IoT can also be
used as a proxy for larger attacks against critical infrastructure,
12

See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 589.

13

Trevor A. Thompson, Terrorizing the Technological Neighborhood Watch: The
Alienation and Deterrence of the “White Hats” Under the CFAA, 36 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 537, 543 (2009).
14

Capers Jones, Software Defect-Removal Efficiency, 29 COMPUTER 94, 94–95
(1996).
See Thompson, supra note 13, at 545 (“Even when software performs as
intended, software cannot fully protect users from themselves.”) See also
Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2449 (2006) (“[I]t is much harder to ‘patch’
a person than a computer.”).
15

16

See Thompson, supra note 13, at 547.

See Derek Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EM. L. REV. 1051,
1060 (“Gartner calculates that 75% of security breaches result from software
flaws.”).
17

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE
4/26/2018

FREEDOM TO HACK
including the very backbone of the Internet – an externality that
neither vendors or IoT users necessarily care about, because they do
not directly experience the adverse effects of those externalities.18
Second, IoT vendors have no economic incentive to offer security
as a feature in their products, primarily because consumers are not
showing strong preferences toward security and privacy as higher
priorities than lower prices. At the very least, informational gaps
between vendors and consumers lead to an uninformed and
inefficient choice by consumers.19 The Senate has recently
recognized this particular market failure and has proposed IoT
industry-focused legislation.20
Ransomware attacks21 are only one example of malicious
activity that criminals or nation-states may use against unsecure IoT
devices, and reports indicate that ransomware against IoT is already
taking place at present.22 Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
18

See Dyn Statement on 10/21/2016 DDoS Attack, https://dyn.com/blog/dynstatement-on-10212016-ddos-attack/ (explaining how an IoT-enabled denial-ofservice attack against DNS provider Dyn made it impossible for Internet users on
the East Coast to reach various websites). See also Bruce Schneier, Your WiFiconnected Thermostat Can Take Down the Whole Internet. We Need New
Regulations,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Nov.
3,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/11/03/your-wificonnected-thermostat-can-take-down-the-whole-internet-we-need-newregulations/ (“An additional market failure illustrated by the Dyn attack is that
neither the seller nor the buyer of those devices cares about fixing the
vulnerability. The owners of those devices don’t care. They wanted a webcam—
or thermostat, or refrigerator—with nice features at a good price. Even after they
were recruited into this botnet, they still work fine—you can’t even tell they were
used in the attack.”).
19

See RICHARD SPINELLO, CYBERETHICS: MORALITY AND LAW IN CYBERSPACE
152 (2006) (explaining that the loss of privacy is a market failure).
20

See Senators Mark Warner, Cory Gardner, Ron Wyden, and Steve Daines,
Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017 – Fact Sheet,
https://www.warner.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/8/6/861d66b8-93bf-4c9384d0-6bea67235047/8061BCEEBF4300EC702B4E894247D0E0.iotcybesecurity-improvement-act---fact-sheet.pdf.
21

See Kim Zetter, What Is Ransomware? A Guide to the Global Cyberattack’s
Scary Method, WIRED (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/hackerlexicon-guide-ransomware-scary-hack-thats-rise (explaining that ransomware is
malware that prevents access to data resident on a target computer by encrypting
data files, without the user being able to access them until he or she pays the
ransom).
22

See Dan Bilefsky, Hackers Use New Tactic at Austrian Hotel: Locking the
Doors, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017) (explaining that computer systems responsible
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attacks,23 data breaches, and surveillance24 are all possible threats to
IoT users if its security problem remains unaddressed.25
Recently, Bruce Schneier, leading cybersecurity and
cryptography expert, referred to the increasing prevalence of IoT
devices as a “World-sized Web,”26 denoting that this ubiquitous
network of devices will benefit corporations seeking to maximize
profits, open new vulnerabilities27 for criminals to exploit, and aid
totalitarian regimes throughout the world. It is almost a cliché in the
information security community that IoT devices are very often
unsecure and relatively easy to hack28 due to an abundancy of
software flaws, unpatched vulnerabilities, and even an inability to
“patch” these devices’ flaws once they are discovered.29 This is

for the electronic key system was hit with ransomware). See also Nathaniel Mott,
Ransomware Didn’t Lock People in Their Hotel Rooms, TOM’S HARDWARE (Jan.
30, 2017), http://www.tomshardware.com/news/ransomware-didnt-lock-hotelrooms,33528.html (claiming that the Austrian hotel ransomware was not quite as
reported, but a regular ransomware affecting generation of new keys).
23

See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2444 (2006) (DDoS attacks are
“self-propagating worms [who] take control of vulnerable computers . . . the
attackers then command the computer to flood the targeted systems with requests
for information, preventing legitimate traffic from getting through.”).
24

See generally Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016).
25

See generally Michael Covington & Rush Carskadden, Threat Implications of
the Internet of Things, 5th INT’L CONF. CY. CONFLICT (2013).
See Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things Will be the World’s Biggest Robot,
SCHNEIER
ON
SECURITY
(Feb.
4,
2016),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/02/the_internet_of_1.html.
26

For the purposes of this Article, “vulnerability” is broadly defined as “a set of
conditions that may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
an information system. It is often a simple oversight or weakness in a computer’s
software that lets the hacker manipulate computer data.” Edward Freeman,
Vulnerability Disclosure: The Strange Case of Bret McDanel, 16 INFORMATION
SYSTEMS SECURITY 127, 127 (2007).
27

28

See Bruce Schneier, IoT Teddy Bear Leaked Personal Audio Recordings,
SCHNEIER
ON
SECURITY
(Mar.
15,
2017),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/03/iot_teddy_bear_.html.
Patchability – the ability to release security updates to fix vulnerabilities, is still
unavailable in many IoT devices, see Bruce Schneier, The Internet of Things is
Wildly Insecure – And Often Unpatchable, WIRED (Jan. 6, 2014),
https://www.wired.com/2014/01/theres-no-good-way-to-patch-the-internet-of29
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largely enabled by market forces, which pressure vendors to create
cheaper devices at the cost of disregarding security and privacy.30 In
other words, this reality is enabled by the tech industry’s drive to
innovate at an accelerated pace,31 while working under the
assumption that embedding cybersecurity could stifle this rapid
innovation rate.32
To address the abovementioned market failure, this Article
argues that outsourcing some of the vulnerability discovery to thirdparty actors – security researchers – would bolster IoT security.
These researchers essentially employ hacking techniques for the
purpose of enhancing security – in other words, they think and act
like a hacker for the company in order to ward off future criminal
hacking.
Currently, federal law imposes significant limitations on
unsolicited hacking for security research through both civil penalties
and criminalization of certain hacking activities, leading to fears of
legal jeopardy among members of the cybersecurity community.33

things-and-thats-a-huge-problem/ (“[I]t’s often impossible to patch the software
or upgrade the components to the latest version.”).
30

See CONNECTED WORLD: EXAMINING THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HEARING
BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
UNITED STATES SENATE, ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS, FIRST
SESSION, S. Hrg. 114–237, 119 (“The computer chips that power these systems
are often cheaply produced, rarely updated or patched, and highly susceptible to
hacks . . . . These devices will be cheap, even disposable, and the incentives for
the manufacturer to provide regular security updates will be minimal.”).
See Schneier (The Internet of Things Is Wildly Insecure – And Often
Unpatchable) supra note 29 (giving an example of how some of the tech industry
operates – “The chip manufacturer is busy shipping the next version of the chip,
and the ODM is busy upgrading its product to work with this next chip.
Maintaining the older chips and products just isn’t a priority. And the software is
old, even when the device is new. For example, one survey of common home
routers found that the software components were four to five years older than the
device”).
31

See Adam Thierer, Andrea O’Suillivan, Leave the Internet of Things Alone,
U.S. NEWS (Jun. 12, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economicintelligence/articles/2017-06-12/dont-stifle-the-internet-of-things-withregulation (arguing that heavy security regulation on IoT will place an undue
burden on the IoT industry).
32

33

UC Berkeley School of Information, Cybersecurity Research: Addressing the
Legal Barriers and Disincentives, at 1 (Sept. 28, 2015), available at
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Exceptions to these legal sanctions, if they exist, are typically very
narrow and would still put benign actors under the threat of legal
consequences from vendors, thus limiting the amount of overall
security research as well as the ability to present such research in an
academic setting for further study and development.34
In order to enhance IoT security, the law, as well as the
institutions creating, interpreting, and applying the law, should
allow hacking for the purpose of security research. Such “benign”
hacking would reveal flaws and weaknesses in software that, if
exploited by malicious actors, could affect not only individuals’
personal security and privacy but even US national security.35 This
approach will increase the efficiency of vulnerability disclosure and
patching because there will be no chilling effect on the activity of
revealing software vulnerabilities.36 To be clear, security research is
only one part of the overall cybersecurity concoction, which should
include, in Lawrence Lessig’s words, an optimal balance between
“public law and private fences.”37 There is a race between
benevolent and malicious actors in cyberspace, and the argument
advanced by this paper seeks to empower actors who wish to
improve the overall security and privacy of IoT.

https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/cybersec-research-nsfworkshop.pdf.
See Derek Bambauer, Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EM. L. REV. 1051,
1054 (2011) (arguing that IP laws stifle critical security research and blocks or
limits the ability to share information relating to security flaws) (citing Jonathan
L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006)).
34

35

See Melissa Hathaway, Cyber Security: An Economic and National Security
Crisis, 16 INTELLIGENCER 31 (2008). Also, see U.S. Department of Defense, DOD
Announces Digital Vulnerability Disclosure Policy and “Hack the Army” Kickoff (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/NewsRelease-View/Article/1009956/dod-announces-digital-vulnerability-disclosurepolicy-and-hack-the-army-kick-off (where then-Secretary of Defense, Ash
Carter, underscores that “We want to encourage computer security researchers to
help us improve our defenses. This policy gives them a legal pathway to bolster
the department’s cybersecurity and ultimately the nation’s security.”).
36

See Malena Carollo, Influencers: Lawsuits to Prevent Reporting Vulnerabilities
Will Chill Research, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Sep. 29, 2015) (providing
data that 75% of leading experts (referred to as “the Influencers”) believe that
lawsuits against vulnerability disclosure in public will have chilling effects on
security research).
37

See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0 170 (2006).
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The underlying hypothesis of this paper is that advancing IoT
technologies will transform our lives entirely by becoming a
substantial part of our society. The ubiquity of sensors, the
physicality of most IoT devices, and the absence of reasonable
default security standards could lead to major threats to individual
and collective security and privacy. The rapid development of this
field has already led to regulatory inefficiency and a serious market
failure, enabling vendors to manufacture and sell unsecure IoT
devices globally. Providing an incentive for the broader security
community to become involved in fixing this ecosystem without
fear of legal jeopardy will make individual users safer while also
protecting critical infrastructure, such as hospitals, power plants,
and the Internet backbone, from IoT externalities.38
This paper will proceed in four parts. In Part I, I will discuss the
phenomenon of IoT – “the world of hackable things” – and provide
an overview of the market failures at play. These market failures are
at the crux of this Article’s argument because they allow threats to
individual users and third-parties to flourish as a result of unsecure
IoT devices. Part II will be dedicated to introducing the security
research environment, in which different types of hackers and
motivations are shaping reality. In Part III, I will focus on the legal
hurdles impeding “the freedom to hack” – mainly the federal
prohibition of circumvention of technological protection measures
(TPMs) and criminal liability for unauthorized access to protected
computers. Finally, Part IV will propose a concrete framework for
creating a normative, technical, and institutional environment in
which security researchers can achieve their goal of making
software more secure by distinguishing benevolent from malicious
actors, strengthening regulatory oversight and enforcement,
clarifying statutory boundaries, regulating patchability, creating a
consistent procedure for disclosure of vulnerabilities, and tackling
security by obscurity.
I.

Internet of Hackable Things

38

See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2443 (2006) (“Not only does
current policy create the wrong incentives regarding cybercrime, it does too little
to encourage computer hackers and computer users to contribute actively to
Intern.”).
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It was probably unimaginable at the conception of the Internet
that one day it would be used to connect everyday “things” to it. The
development of this phenomenon allowed for machine-to-machine
communication, the “communication between . . . entities that do
not necessarily need any direct human intervention.”39 Whether
through a smart thermostat that learns a user’s temperature-setting
patterns,40 a bracelet that tells a user how well she exercises and
sleeps,41 a webcam that can wirelessly transmit photos and videos,42
a smart toaster offering the perfect toast,43 or a car that has the ability
to connect to the Internet and offer navigation services, selfdiagnosis tools, and remote control through widely used
smartphones,44 such machine-to-machine networks abound.
There is a growing understanding that “things with computers
embedded in them” are becoming “computers with things attached
to them.”45 This means that a whole set of legal issues traditionally
pertaining to computers are transposed into the area of ordinary
daily objects, but those ordinary daily objects now have a few extra
features that make questions of legality tremendously challenging.
For example, previously, if a toaster malfunctioned, it would have
been mainly a consumer protection problem, whereas today, it might
as well be a telecommunications problem, involving a whole set of
39

Roberto Minerva, Abyi Biru & Domenico Rotondi, Towards a Definition of the
Internet of Things (IoT), IEEE INTERNET INITIATIVE, 12 (May 27, 2015),
http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_
Things _Revision1_27MAY15.pdf
40

Nest, Meet the Thermostat, https://nest.com/thermostat/meet-nest-thermostat.

41

See Andrew Meola, Wearable Technology and IoT Wearable Devices,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/wearabletechnology-iot-devices-2016-8.
42

See Haley Edwards, How Web Cams Helped Bring Down the Internet, Briefly,
TIME (Oct. 25, 2016), http://time.com/4542600/internet-outage-web-camshackers.
43

Joel Hruska, The Internet of Things Has Officially Peak Stupid, Courtesy of
This
Smart
Toaster,
EXTREME
TECH
(Jan.
5,
2017),
https://www.extremetech.com/electronics/242169-internet-things-officially-hitpeak-stupid-courtesy-smart-toaster-griffin-technology.
See Thilo Koslowski, Forget the Internet of Things: Here Comes the ‘Internet
of Cars’, WIRED (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/01/forget-theinternet-of-things-here-comes-the-internet-of-cars.
44

45

See Bruce Schneier, Security and the Internet of Things, SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY
(Feb.
1,
2017),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/02/security_and_th.html.
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challenges pertaining to privacy and security and, in more extreme
circumstances, national security.46
While the general phenomenon of IoT is somewhat intuitive in
today’s hyperconnected world, there is no official or widely adopted
definition of the technology. One definition is “the ability of
everyday objects to connect to the Internet and to send and receive
data,”47 a feature that was previously nonexistent in everyday
“things.” Another definition provides that IoT is “a network of
items—each embedded with sensors—which are connected to the
Internet”48; another similar definition characterizes IoT as a “system
where the Internet is connected to the physical world via ubiquitous
sensors.”49 While Internet connectivity is itself quite intuitive, often
missing in defining IoT is an emphasis on the sensors, actuators, and
CPUs, or cloud computers,50 that often comprise the IoT ecosystem.
Unlike personal computers (desktop, laptops, smartphones, and
the like), IoT devices often lack a user interface, or at least one that
allows control over security and privacy features.51 IoT should also
be contrasted from popular operating systems, which are supported
by large tech companies who constantly offer updates to the
software. This largely means that the degree of user control over the
configuration of a device is significantly limited and is usually
46

See Mike Orcutt, Security Experts Warn Congress That Internet of Things
Could
Kill
People,
M.I.T.
TECH.
REV.
(Dec.
5,
2016),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603015/security-experts-warn-congressthat-the-internet-of-things-could-kill-people.
INTERNET OF THINGS – PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED WORLD, FTC
STAFF REPORT i (Jan. 2015).
47

48

See Kathy Pretz, Smart Sensors, THE INSTITUTE OF ELECTRICAL AND
ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS (Mar. 14, 2014), http://theinstitute.ieee.org/technologytopics/internet-of-things/smarter-sensors.
49

Roberto Minerva, Abyi Biru, and Domenico Rotondi, Towards a Definition of
the Internet of Things (IoT), IEEE INTERNET INITIATIVE, 10 (May 27, 2015),
http://iot.ieee.org/images/files/pdf/IEEE_IoT_Towards_Definition_Internet_of_
Things _Revision1_27MAY15.pdf.
50

The fact that many IoT devices are supported by cloud computing creates and
additional risk to privacy, since data stored on the cloud could potentially become
the target of a data breach against the cloud itself. See Bambauer, supra note 34,
at 1059 (providing an example of cloud weakness that led to a security breach
against Twitter).
51

FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at v.
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controlled by the vendor, if at all. It is expected that the vendor will
provide reasonable security already built into the device – “security
by design” – but unfortunately, the current state of affairs in IoT has
proven otherwise.52
Understanding the physicality of IoT is crucial if we are to create
solutions to the wide range of resulting legal challenges. IoT
insecurity is not merely a theoretical threat – it is an actual danger
to our very homes. Typically, an IoT device is comprised of three
components – a sensor, a CPU (or cloud computer), and an
actuator.53 While a sensor collects data about its users and
environment,54 the CPU (or “the cloud”) processes that data and
potentially commands the actuator to take appropriate actions.
These two components are essential for controlling the actuator,
which is an “output device[] that implement[s] decisions.”55 For
example, a sensor could be a thermostat used to monitor the
temperature, with a connected CPU tasked with determining
whether the air conditioner should be turned on or off, which would
be accomplished through the actuator, the actual object that this
whole system was built to control. In a way, sensors are the “eyes
and ears” of the Internet, and the actuators are “hands and feet.” The
CPUs, in this analogy, would be the brain, since they process data
and react to it according to certain predetermined software-based
rules.56
Since a typical user has little to no control over the security
features (and many other features) of their specific device,
enhancing the security of the device will necessarily require the user
to tinker with the software, which could violate the anticircumvention rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
See Symantec, An Internet of Things Reference Architecture (2016) (“Most IoT
devices are “closed.” Customers can’t add security software after devices ship
from the factory. Often, such tampering voids the warranty. For such reasons,
security has to be built into IoT devices so that they are “secure by design.” In
other words, for IoT, security must evolve from security just “bolted onto”
existing systems such as servers and personal computer (PC) laptops and
desktops. Security must evolve to security that is “built in” to the system before
the system leaves the factory.”).
52

53

See Schneier, supra note 2.

54

Id.

55

See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1003.

56

See Schneier, supra note 2.
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(DMCA), unless the user is explicitly exempt from legal liability.57
In addition, security researchers who might want to probe specific
IoT devices for vulnerabilities might encounter threats of criminal
liability and prosecution if the manner in which they access these
devices is unauthorized – which includes virtually any form of
hacking.58
Therefore, users often have to rely on vendors’ practices of
vulnerability patching and security by design, which do not always
exist in a market of accelerated innovation and competition,
particularly in cheaper devices.59 In many instances, a vendor’s
decision whether to provide vulnerability patches is a question of
risk assessment and market forces – and market forces, particularly
in the tech industry, do not always work in favor of consumers (if
we assume that privacy and security are in the interest of
consumers).60 This is perhaps more alarming considering that the
57

See Aaron Alva, DMCA Security Research Exemption For Consumer Devices,
Tech@FTC (Federal Trade Commission), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/techftc/2016/10/dmca-security-research-exemption-consumerdevices.
58

See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2). See also Erin Fleury, Is It Illegal to Test Websites
For Security Flaws? Heartbleed & The CFAA, MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. F. (Dec.
30, 2014), http://editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/is-it-illegal-to-test-websites-forsecurity-flaws-heartbleed-the-cfaa (arguing that the discovery of the OpenSSL
Heartbleed security flaw, which allowed intercepting encrypted information,
caused systems “to send back far more than what is intended. Of course, the
CFAA is meant to target people who use exploits such as this to gain unauthorized
access to computer systems, so it would seem that using Heartbleed is clearly
within the scope and purpose of the CFAA. The real problem arises, however, for
people interested in independently (i.e. without authorization) testing a system to
determine if it is still susceptible to Heartbleed or other vulnerabilities”).
See Rapid7’s Comment to NTIA’s call for public comments on “The Benefits,
Challenges, and Potential Roles for the Government in Fostering the
Advancement
of
the
Internet
of
Things”,
available
at
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/rapid7_comments_to_ntia_iot_r
fc_-_jun_2_2016.pdf (“Since IoT devices are highly diversified and include very
inexpensive items manufactured by companies with limited security experience,
the result can be a considerably more exploitable environment than the status
quo.”).
59

See Keynote Remarks of FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny, “Consumer
Protection in the Age of Connected Everything” 3 (New York Law School, Feb.
3,
2017)
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070193/mcswe
eny_nyls_iot_sympoisum.pdf (“Consumer concern is heightened by business
practices that often leave them in the lurch: IoT products may not have patch
60
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cost of security breaches to users in aggregate is significantly higher
than the cost to vendors, which could explain the gap in expectations
between vendors and users.61 In other words, “systems are
particularly prone to failure[] when the person guarding them is not
the person who suffers when they fail.”62
a. The Economics of IoT
Many assume that the market will eventually solve the security
and privacy problems of the IoT ecosystem. But this may not be
accurate given that these problems are themselves a result of a
market failure. The unlikelihood of a market solution is particularly
stark when examined in terms of the costs associated with cyberattacks on IoT, which are often experienced by third parties and are
therefore considered externalities.63 Because such externalities
involve a wide variety of sectors and actors, with varying degrees of
costs and benefits, the prospect of an efficient transaction is
unlikely.
When it comes to externalities in software, it is often believed
that software vulnerabilities are “inevitable externalities” because
flawless software64 does not yet exist. This is further exacerbated by
the pressure on vendors by competition to release software to the
market as fast as they can.65 While this trend is generally true, it is
support or the same life expectancy as other connected products, and these
limitations are not always communicated clearly to consumers… Consumers are
repeatedly saying that data security is a top barrier to purchasing connected
devices.”).
61

See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1059 (“[U]sers face greater harm than vendors
do, especially overall. While precise figures are difficult to ascertain, reliable
estimates of the worldwide economic damage caused by digital attacks in 2003
range from $12.5 billion for worms and viruses, and $226 billion for all attacks,
to $157–$192 billion on Windows PCs alone in 2004. Losses to vendors from
security breaches, such as from increased support costs, reputational harm, and
declines in share price, are also uncertain, but likely considerably smaller.
Vendors, therefore, have less incentive to fix bugs than is socially optimal.”)
62

Anderson & Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 SCIENCE 610,
610 (2006).
63

See Schneier, supra note 2.

64

See JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY 142–44 (Mike Loukides ed., 2009).
See also Jay Pil Choi et al., Network Security: Vulnerabilities and Disclosure
Policy, 58 J. INDUS. ECON. 868, 869 (2010).
65

See Micah Schwalb, Exploit Derivatives & National Security, 9 YALE J. L. &
TECH. 162, 168–69 (2007).
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still possible to make software better through constant fixing of
vulnerabilities, therefore reaching a socially optimal level of
security.
Furthermore, companies who decide to enter the IoT market do
not always have the experience needed to implement security
features in their devices.66 There is a sizable degree of opportunism
when it comes to new players in the IoT industry, making unsecure
IoT devices pervasive.
In addition, IoT devices are largely inexpensive and disposable,
which precludes most costly security features.67 The literature
identifies additional reasons for ubiquitous unsecure IoT devices –
lack of experience in data security among vendors, absence of
processing power in most IoT devices for “robust security measures
such as encryption,” and unforeseen threats,68 given that the
attackers are humans who constantly adapt and change their
methods.69 The recurring theme is the inability of vendors to fully
solve the potential security flaws in IoT devices on their own.
At the same time, the users themselves are often unaware of the
risks; IoT architecture is often driven by vendors attempting to
reduce costs, and the individual consumer is typically interested in
a product’s features, rather than its security settings.70 Whereas
computers have been hackable since their conception, the IoT
ecosystem increases the stakes to a far greater state of urgency. This
is largely enabled by the physicality of IoT, which can cause serious
physical harms, and the ubiquitous sensors, which pose a privacy
concern to users.71 This notion is further supported by the
66

FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.

67

FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.

68

See Poudel, supra note 7, at 1015 (citing Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet
of Things: First Steps Towards Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security &
Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 135–36 (2014)).
69

NIELS FERGUSON & BRUCE SCHNEIER, PRACTICAL CRYPTOGRAPHY 5, 11–12
(2003).
70

See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at i–ii.

See Schneier, supra note 2 (“All computers are hackable. This has as much to
do with the computer market as it does with the technologies. We prefer our
software full of features and inexpensive, at the expense of security and reliability.
That your computer can affect the security of Twitter is a market failure. The
industry is filled with market failures that, until now, have been largely ignorable.
71
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unwillingness of certain tech companies to patch their software if it
does not yield an effective cost-benefit analysis.72 Furthermore,
while security and privacy are certainly important to consumers, it
is unclear whether consumers will agree to pay more for a product
that is more secure, even if current vendor–user informational gaps
are decreased.73 This suggests that even if informing users of the
risks is unlikely to solve the problem of unsecure IoT.
The classic solution to externalities resulting from market
failures is government intervention in the form of legislation and
regulation.74 This Article takes another approach – legislation and
regulation of the IoT industry are certainly required, but they could
be far more efficient in conjunction with the lifting of burdens
constraining security researchers. In other words, the market failure
described in this subchapter can be mitigated by security researchers
improving software quality through ethical hacking.
b. The Technology of IoT
IoT offers a convenience not previously available in offline
objects. First, the user has some remote control over certain features
of the device, often from a smartphone or personal computer. She
has the ability to customize and monitor the functionality of her
appliances, though this is often limited through the user interface
provided by the vendor.75 Second, IoT technology equips vendors

As computers continue to permeate our homes, cars, businesses, these market
failures will no longer be tolerable. Our only solution will be regulation, and that
regulation will be foisted on us by a government desperate to "do something" in
the face of disaster.”).
See Andrew Aurenheimer, Forget Disclosure – Hackers Should Keep Security
Holes
to
Themselves,
WIRED
(Nov.
29,
2012),
https://www.wired.com/2012/11/hacking-choice-and-disclosure (“[T]he vendor
may decide not to release a patch because a cost/benefit analysis conducted by an
in-house MBA determines that it’s cheaper to simply do . . . nothing.”).
72

73

See Jay Kesan & Carol Hayes, Bugs in the Market: Creating A Legitimate,
Transparent, and Vendor-Focused Market for Software Vulnerabilities, 58 ARIZ.
L. REV. 753, 781–82 (2016).
74

See Eli Dourado & Jerry Brito, Is There a Market Failure in Cybersecurity?,
106 MERCATUS ON POLICY (2012), p. 2.
75
See Nick Feamster, Who Will Secure the Internet of Things? FREEDOM TO
TINKER
(Jan.
19,
2016),
available
at
https://freedom-totinker.com/2016/01/19/who-will-secure-the-internet-of-things (“Manufacturers
of consumer products have little interest in releasing software patches and may
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with the ability to optimize and improve their products through
processing user data generated by the devices. However, this comes
at a cost, since consumer data may also be used in negative ways,
such as aggressive advertising, sale to third parties, or enhancement
of surveillance capabilities.76 Third, IoT technology offers
interoperability between devices, which, though it is yet to be fully
developed, allows devices to communicate with each other.77 These
benefits may sometimes even relate to the health, quality of life, and
wellbeing of the user. Insulin pumps and pacemakers are examples
of IoT applications in healthcare that revolutionized diagnosis and
medical treatment, making these patients’ health much more
manageable.78
Cybersecurity risks and threats existed long before the advent of
IoT, and the argument made by this Article could apply equally to
IoT and non-IoT environments, since software will have flaws
regardless of the platform on which it runs. However, the IoT
ecosystem creates a serious challenge and shakes up some basic
cybersecurity assumptions – it significantly broadens the attack
surface that hackers can use, and the level of harm to autonomy is
also far greater, thus trivializing hacking in general but also making
it more personal.79 This will result in more opportunistic hacking,
even design the device without any interfaces for patching the software in the first
place.”).
76

See generally Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth
Amendment of Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805 (2016).
77

See Charles McLellan, M2M and the Internet of Things: A Guide, ZDNet (Jan.
10, 2013), http://www.zdnet.com/article/m2m-and-the-internet-of-things-aguide.
See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 8. (“connected health devices can
“improve quality of life and safety by providing a richer source of data to the
patient’s doctor for diagnosis and treatment[,] . . . improve disease prevention,
making the healthcare system more efficient and driving costs down[,] . . . [and]
provide an incredible wealth of data, revolutionizing medical research and
allowing the medical community to better treat, and ultimately eradicate,
diseases.”).
78

79

Oliver Tavakoli, The Unintended Attack Surface of the Internet of Things, DARK
READING (Sept. 29, 2015), www.darkreading.com/vulnerabilities---threats/theunintended-attack-surface-of-the-internet-of-things/a/d-id/1322393
(“[T]he
combination of poorly written code and infrequent updates will surely lead to a
broader and less manageable attack surface.”). See also FTC IOT REPORT, supra
note 6, at 11 (“[A]s consumers install more smart devices in their homes, they
may increase the number of vulnerabilities an intruder could use to compromise
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whereby users’ security or privacy may be compromised for
potential criminal ends.80
Law and regulation will find it increasingly difficult to address
IoT hacking, due to its immense pervasiveness, volume, and transborder effects and origins. This will leave the most trivial hacking
activities unaddressed from a law enforcement perspective.81 The
argument in this Article, therefore, proposes enhance security by
fixing vulnerabilities through a legal system that legitimizes the
activities undertaken by security researchers. These researchers
employ hacking and reverse-engineering techniques for the purpose
of identifying security flaws and reporting them to the respective
vendor and, eventually, the public.
The following sub-sections elaborate on why the IoT ecosystem
is particularly challenging in the cybersecurity context – sensors are
everywhere, processors are operating physical objects, and the
distinctions between software and hardware are eroding. These IoTspecific challenges are creating a particularly vulnerable
environment.
1. The Ubiquity of Sensors
The IoT ecosystem is creating a world of ubiquitous sensors.82
These sensors are the eyes and ears of the Internet, collecting data
personal information.”); La Marca & Paez, The Internet of Things: Emerging
Legal Issues for Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 46 (2016) (“As the number of
Internet-connected objects expands, so too does the potential attack surface. The
loT faces serious security issues because it is based on interoperability and
interdependence: more interactions among devices lead to more areas of
vulnerability.”).
80

Mihai Lazaresu, Hacked by Your Fridge: the Internet of Things Could Spark a
New Wave of Cyber Attacks, THE CONVERSATION (Oct. 7, 2016),
https://theconversation.com/hacked-by-your-fridge-the-internet-of-things-couldspark-a-new-wave-of-cyber-attacks-66493.
81

Scholars recognize the limits of law enforcement in the world of computer
crime. See Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop
Worrying and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2445 (2006)
(“[C]ybercrime cannot be effectively combated solely with traditional law
enforcement tools.”).
82

See Arkady Zaslavsky, Internet of Things and Ubiquitous Sensing, COMPUTER
(Sept.
2013),
https://www.computer.org/web/computingnow/archive/september2013 (“With
billions of ICOs [Internet-connected objects] and a diverse abundance of sensors,
the IoT will be an enabler of ubiquitous sensing.”).
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about the environment and processing and possibly transmitting that
data elsewhere.83 These sensors are working continuously, and they
are everywhere. IoT devices enable not only data about direct
computer use but also data about driving, home heating and cooling,
food stored in a refrigerator, pulse and blood pressure, sleep
patterns, and much more.
These distributed data can tell a lot about a specific person. The
most private and nonintuitive pieces of information about a user are
constantly collected by IoT devices and may enable misuse for
criminal, business, law enforcement, and other purposes.84 The
richness of data within the IoT ecosystem has also led to law
enforcement finding this space appealing for surveillance.85
2. Physicality
A significant characteristic of IoT is its physicality. Processors
embedded in IoT devices are tasked to operate actual, physical
equipment, with tangible consequences in the physical world. Think
of a smart thermostat, which learns about the preferences of the user
but is also tasked to turn on or off a piece of equipment – the AC or
furnace – when certain conditions are met. In this way, the IoT
device commands the actuator, meaning that any meddling with IoT
could have physical ramifications due to actuators malfunctioning,
at times posing danger to physical security. Examples include a

83

See Hakima Chaouchi & Thomas Bourgeau, Internet of Things: From Real to
Virtual World, in NAVEEN CHILAMKURTI, SHERALI ZEADALLY, HAKIMA
CHAOUCHI (EDS.), NEXT-GENERATION WIRELESS TECHNOLOGIES: 4G AND
BEYOND 161, 173 (2013) (listing some examples of data collected by sensors –
“mechanical data (position, force, pressure), thermal data (temperature, heat
flow), electrostatic or magnetic field, radiation intensity (electromagnetic,
nuclear), chemical data (humidity, ion, gas concentration), and biological data
(toxicity, presence of bio organisms)”).
84

See Symantec, Internet Security Threat Report Vol. 21, 16 (Apr. 2016),
https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/reports/istr-21-2016en.pdf.
85

See Andrew Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment
Effects, 104 CAL. L. REV. 805, 810 (2016) (“The Internet of Things offers new
surveillance possibilities that do not involve any physical intrusion into the object.
As currently designed, these objects radiate data trails quite useful for law
enforcement tracking.”).
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vehicle not responding to its driver’s actions, a disabled insulin
pump, and a garage door that won’t open.
In other words, today’s everyday objects are creating
telecommunications problems that challenge notions of security and
privacy. These challenges are similar whether we talk about
healthcare equipment, household objects, or transportation. The
effects, however, may be tremendously different – a malfunctioning
pacemaker could lead to death, whereas a disabled wearable
smartwatch is a matter of inconvenience or, at most, a privacy
violation.
3. Software and Hardware Distinction
Although the growing role and share of software in the overall
IoT environment cannot be overstated, hardware also poses a host
of challenges to the security and privacy associated with IoT. 86 For
example, researchers at the University of Michigan have recently
learned that a CPU manufactured in China had a backdoor built by
design into the CPU.87 This enables a small portion of the CPU to
be used as an entryway for malware, which can then obtain control
over the device. Since IoT devices have CPUs embedded in them,
this represents an actual threat to the integrity and resilience of IoT.
From a security and privacy perspective, both the software and
the hardware need to be regulated and monitored for potential
vulnerabilities that could affect the normal functioning of a device.
Regulatory agencies in the U.S. are increasingly focusing their
efforts on software, which many believe will be “eating the world”
and taking over the digital sphere. But even if this prediction is
accurate, hardware may still be designed in a way that allows
exploitation, particularly if it is under-regulated due to the appeal of
software regulation. Hardware represents an even bigger “blackSee Andy Greenberg, Forget Software – Now Hackers Are Exploiting Physics,
WIRED (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/new-form-hackingbreaks-ideas-computers-work (“The trick works by running a program on the
target computer, which repeatedly overwrites a certain row of transistors in its
DRAM flash memory, “hammering” it until a rare glitch occurs: Electric charge
leaks from the hammered row of transistors into an adjacent row. The leaked
charge then causes a certain bit in that adjacent row of the computer's memory to
flip from one to zero or vice versa. That bit flip gives you access to a privileged
level of the computer's operating system.”).
86

87

See Kaiyuan Yang, Matthew Hicks, Qing Dong, Todd Austin, Dennis Sylvester,
A2: Analog Malicious Hardware, 2016 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND
PRIVACY, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7546493.
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box” problem, since it is extremely time consuming and complicated
to determine how a specific computer component works, whereas
software is relatively easier to grasp – as security researchers have
demonstrated recently. Therefore, the analysis provided by this
Article, while focusing mostly on software, could still be applicable
to security research into hardware.
c. The Threats of IoT
The characteristics of sensor abundancy and general physicality
of IoT lead us to a third attribute, which is particularly alarming. IoT
devices are not typically manufactured with robust or even minimal
security standards (technical, and possibly mechanical). The IoT
market failure results in vendors not implementing security in their
IoT devices, mostly due to competition – in other words, in order to
reduce manufacturing costs and offer a cheaper product. On the
other hand, the average consumer does not typically demand strong
security features, most likely due to informational gaps.
This suggests that IoT unsecurity is a global problem, since the
same security-lacking devices would be present in the U.S. just as
in other parts of the world. Regardless, the U.S. has an important
role to play from a legal perspective by setting robust standards and
best practices for the rest of the world to follow, including the ethical
hacking of IoT devices advanced by this paper. In addition, many
IoT vendors are based in the U.S. and so fall under the jurisdiction
of U.S. laws and regulations, and so ethical hacking within the U.S.
would secure both domestic devices as well as those that are
exported to elsewhere in the world.
The IoT revolution comes with a price. While the ability of
everyday objects to connect to the Internet offers a broad range of
advantages, it also poses a set of specific challenges, stemming from
the vulnerabilities that these devices have almost by default. The
literature generally identifies three major threats with today’s IoT
ecosystem – privacy, individual user security, and third-party
security.88

88

See Sir Mark Walport, The Internet of Things: Making the Most of the Second
Digital Revolution, UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., 15 no. 3 (Dec. 2014),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/4
09774/ 14-1230-internet-of-things-review.pdf. Also, see FTC IOT REPORT, supra
note 6, p. 10 – (Where the FTC identifies these three threats, providing that
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First, since IoT sensors collect data about their respective users
and their environment, unauthorized actors may attempt to access
that personal information for a variety of reasons. Having security
features within an IoT device could make it much harder for these
unauthorized actors to access personal information. However,
privacy breaches could then still be committed by vendors and other
third parties who seek to monetize the collected data, which could
also be labeled as a privacy risk.
Second, malicious actors may try to hack into IoT devices and
meddle with the functionality of the device. For example, hackers
may decide to shut down a car’s engine,89 lock a hotel room while
demanding ransom,90 or disable a pacemaker.91 These are security
risks confined to the user.
Third, IoT devices may be used individually (a single IoT
device) or collectively (an “army” of compromised IoT devices) to
facilitate an attack or breach targeting another computer system.92
In this case, the IoT is used merely as a proxy, which allows the
hacker to have more disruptive power (if multiple IoT devices are
used for a specific attack) and to mask her or his identity. This is the
manifestation of the externalities discussed supra. For example, a
hundred thousand compromised IoT devices were used to mount a
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Domain Name

unsecure IoT is – “(1) enabling unauthorized access and misuse of personal
information, (2) facilitating attacks on other systems, and (3) creating physical
safety risks.”)
89

See Craig Timberg, Hacks on the Highway, WASHINGTON POST (July 22, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/07/22/hacks-on-the-highway.
90

See Josephine Wolff, The Ransomware Attack That Locked Hotel Guests Out
of
Their
Rooms,
SLATE
(Feb.
1,
2017),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2017/02/the_ransomware
_attack_that_locked_hotel_guests_out_of_their_rooms.html.
91

See Morie Moe, Go Ahead, Hackers. Break My Heart, WIRED (Mar. 14, 2016),
https://www.wired.com/2016/03/go-ahead-hackers-break-heart.
See FTC IoT Report, supra note 6, at 12. (“[A] compromised loT device could
be used to launch a denial of service attack. Denial of service attacks are more
effective the more devices the attacker has under his or her control; as loT devices
proliferate, vulnerabilities could enable these attackers to assemble large numbers
of devices to use in such attacks. Another possibility is that a connected device
could be used to send malicious emails.”).
92
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System (DNS) provider Dyn.93 The Dyn attack made it impossible
for Internet users to access websites like Twitter, Netflix, and
Reddit.94 This is a security risk against third parties – against the
Internet.
1. User Privacy

IoT devices often generate data about the consumer, which
raises the risk of these data being compromised. Many consumers
would not be able to differentiate between an Internet-connected
object and its offline counterpart in terms of the potential privacy
implications. Data collected by IoT devices may pose a host of
privacy concerns. For example, in the case of an IoT device used to
measure blood alcohol – the Breathometer – collected data may
impact “employment decisions, criminal liability implications, and
health, life, car insurance ramifications.”95 The data collection,
retention, and disposal policies of a specific manufacturer are not
always communicated to the consumer in a transparent and
accessible manner.96 This is of course not unique to the
Breathometer, as other IoT devices collect sensitive personal data as
well.
These problematic uses of personal information are not the end
of the story. Certain devices might require the use of payment
methods and passwords, which could be accessed and misused by
cyber criminals seeking financial gain.97 If this sensitive information
is not properly secured, the number of vulnerabilities and
93

See Scott Hilton, Dyn Analysis Summary of Friday October 21 Attack,
VANTAGEPOINT DYN COMPANY NEWS, https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysissummary-of-friday-october-21-attack/.
94

See Schneier, supra note 2.

95

See Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Towards
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Conesnt, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 90
(2014).
See Peppet, supra note 95, at 90 (“[M]any ‘things’ have little in their external
form that suggests they are connected to the Internet. When you grab an Internetconnected scarf from the coat rack or sit on an Internet connected chair, should
you have some obvious sign that data will be transmitted or an action triggered?”)
(citing ADRIAN MCEWEN & HAKIM CASSIMALLY, DESIGNING THE INTERNET OF
THINGS 294 (2014)).
96

97

See Roey Tzezana, Scenarios for Crime and Terrorist Attacks Using The
Internet Of Things, 4(18) EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF FUTURES RESEARCH 17 (2016).
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compromises will increase, exposing personal information to
malicious actors.
Another major problem that is currently emerging in the privacy
law scholarship is sensor fusion98 – when innocuous and seemingly
insignificant data collected by an individual IoT sensor could be
used to make inferences about the user when paired with data
collected from other IoT sensors. Collectively, the data could be
used to make near-certain inferences about the user, though the
individual pieces of data would have no meaning on their own. This
could be used to make powerful inferences about the user. For
example, data from a smartphone’s gyroscope could be used to
determine the driving habits of a user; when paired with an IoT
pacemaker, the combination of these data can yield an inference
about the emotional state and mood of the user.99 Scholars identify
a long list of inferences that would be possible under the emerging
IoT ecosystem of data collection – “a user’s mood; stress levels;
personality type; bipolar disorder; demographics (e.g., gender,
marital status, job status, age); smoking habits; overall wellbeing;
progression of Parkinson’s disease; sleep patterns; happiness; levels
of exercise; and types of physical activity or movement.”100
Considering how personal and sensitive some of these data are, IoT
devices should allow for stronger security to prevent breaches that
could be devastating to users.
Daniel Solove calls this problem “data aggregation” and argues
that, “[v]iewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day
information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins
to paint a portrait about our personalities.”101 The bottom line is that
malicious actors have many methods of abusing private information
See Peppet, supra note 95, at 118–24 (“Sensor fusion is the combining of sensor
data from different sources to create a resulting set of information that is better
than if the information is used separately.”).
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See Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2002) (“Viewed in isolation, each
piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination,
it begins to paint a portrait about our personalities. The aggregation problem arises
from the fact that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily
amassed and combined. Even information in public records that is superficial or
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals.
Information breeds information.”).
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they collect without authorization, particularly if they can collect
that information across multiple IoT devices.
It must be noted that many of the data described in this subsection would not be considered personally identifiable information
(PII), which, if compromised, imposes notification responsibilities
on vendors. However, PII does not typically include sensor data, or
anonymized data, which is often re-identifiable.102 This difficulty
seems to suggest that the focus at present should be on enhancing
IoT security until federal and state regulations address the full
breadth of data that ought to be protected by vendors. At present,
relying on state laws regulating notification of data breaches would
not necessarily solve the problem of sensor fusion.
2. User Security

Vulnerabilities in a specific device may facilitate potential
exploitations against that specific device and, consequently, its user.
The primary target in this case is not the data in the device but rather
the device’s functionality. For example, a hacker may decide to
attack a thermostat using a ransomware method, meaning that the
user will be unable to use the thermostat until she or he pays the
ransom.103 The data are not the primary interest for the hacker here
– whereas disrupting the normal functioning of the device is. This
hack is also enabled by weak security standards and vulnerabilities
in software.
Recently, an Austrian hotel suffered a ransomware attack
targeting its smart-locks. The attack locked up hotel rooms until the
hotel gave up and paid the ransom in order to restore the functioning
of the locks. In that case, hackers did not care about who used the
locks, or how, or when.104
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See Alexander Tran, The Internet of Things and Potential Remedies in Privacy
Tort Law, 50 COLUM. J. L. SOC. PROB. 263, 275-276 (2017) (arguing that many
state laws are not dealing with sensor data, which may be re-identifiable, with
Texas’ statute being one of the only exceptions, providing a broad definition to
“sensitive personal information”).
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See Dan Raywood, #DefCon: Thermostat Control Hacked to Host
Ransomware, INFO SECURITY (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.infosecuritymagazine.com/news/defcon-thermostat-control-hacked.
104
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User security may take a more serious form if the target is a lifesustaining IoT device such as the pacemaker. In fact, security
researchers revealed recently that pacemakers have 19 security
vulnerabilities and are plagued with as many as 8,600 security
flaws.105 In addition, security researchers were able to hack into
insulin pumps and disable their medicine delivery settings.106
Potentially, a hacker exploiting one or more of these vulnerabilities
could cause a life-threatening situation, ranging from a serious
bodily harm to the user or, in extreme situations, even death.107
Vulnerable IoT devices could also be used to access the network
through which they connect to the Internet, which would expose
other devices on the network to potential compromise. Even if a
specific vendor employs the strictest security features for their IoT
devices, that would not necessarily protect all IoT devices within a
household, as there are many vendors with varying degrees of IoT
security implementations.108 This is analogous in a way to the Target
breach, which surprisingly was directed not at Target’s computer
network but rather at a contractor who had weaker data-protection
standards. That hack resulted in forty million credit cards being
stolen in one of the biggest data breaches in recent years.109
The bottom line is that a compromise to user security can range
in its effects from inconvenience, such as the device being slowed
105
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https://qz.com/997803/pacemakers-have-thousands-of-vulnerabilities-hackerscan-exploit-study-finds/.
106

See FTC IOT REPORT, supra note 6, at 12.

107

See Lily Newman, Medical Devices Are The Next Security Nightmare, WIRED
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devastating ransomware attack that holds vital systems hostage until
administrators pay up. ‘The entire extortion landscape has changed,’ says Ed
Cabrera, chief cybersecurity officer at the threat research firm Trend Micro. ‘You
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down, to complete disruption of the device, to a life-threatening
situation, depending on the targeted device, motivation, and the
method of exploitation employed.
3. Third-Party Security

The proliferation of IoT creates an environment of potentially
millions of vulnerable devices. This enables hackers to create
enslaved IoT devices that can be used as a proxy for attacking third
parties – commonly referred to as “botnets.”110 Botnets are
essentially armies of Internet-connected devices compromised
through a malware that infects them and allows the attacker (the “bot
master”) to command that group of devices. The most intuitive form
of third-party security risk due to IoT botnets is a DDoS attack. The
key in a DDoS attack (as opposed to a DoS attack) is in the
overwhelming volume of requests, which essentially shuts down the
target due to its unavailable bandwidth for responding to legitimate
requests of service.
In October 2016, a malware named Mirai created a botnet out of
a hundred thousand compromised IoT devices used it to mount a
DDoS attack against a Domain Name System (DNS) service
provider, Dyn.111 DNS is the basic protocol that translates
alphanumerical addresses (www.nytimes.com, for example) to
numerical IP addresses (like 192.168.1.182), which are then
translated into a computer’s binary language in blocks of eight bits
(11000000 10101000 00000001 10110110). The Internet’s TCP/IP
protocol works with binary addresses, which it “understands,”
whereas alphanumerical addresses are a convention that enables
humans to conveniently browse the Internet without having to
memorize a list of numerical IP addresses. This structure is an easy
target for a malicious actor who wishes to shut down portions of the
World Wide Web and make it impossible for the average user to
access websites and services online.
II.

THE SECURITY RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT

110
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In cybersecurity, it is essential to understand the enemy in order
to resolve the threats and challenges that exist largely due to certain
forms of hacking. Hacking tends to have a negative connotation – it
frequently implies malevolent, possibly illegal, activity in relation
to computers and networks.112 But hacking culture is more diverse
than that. Criminally motivated hackers, or “black hat hackers,” are
only a subset of the larger group of hackers – in fact, a tiny
proportion, only about 1%.113 Hackers tend to have different
motivations, purposes, and incentives, ranging from seeking a thrill
or challenge, or resolving and fixing vulnerabilities, to extorting a
user, disrupting the functioning of computers and networks, stealing
data and credentials, and potentially selling the data or
vulnerabilities in a designated marketplace on the Internet.
Similarly, people tinker with their devices for a variety of
reasons – for fun, to study, or to fix vulnerabilities and weaknesses,
but also for criminal and destructive purposes.114 More importantly,
hackers have a clear advantage over vendors when it comes to
finding vulnerabilities.115 While a vendor may be focused on other
tasks, hackers can dedicate their time to further study a specific
system and identify its flaws. Hackers also tend to have the cuttingedge knowledge that allows them to reveal vulnerabilities in creative
ways. Considering that it is far easier to attack than to defend in
cyberspace – the attacker needs to know of only one vulnerability,
while the defender has to defend against all possible attacks –
provides yet another argument in favor of ethical hacking for
security purposes.116 Efficient cyber-defense strategies, therefore,
have to rely on a robust cybersecurity research environment, which
involves hacking.117
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This section will explain the three main categories of hackers,
which may assist in the further analysis of the “freedom to hack.”
These categories are typically assigned a color – white, gray, or
black. These colors reflect the morality of the hacking – which may
also suggest its legality, though the two are not mutually
dependent.118 As this section demonstrates, the boundary between
legitimate and illegitimate hacking is somewhat fuzzy,119 given that
both ethical and criminal hackers are utilizing the same techniques,
and at first blush, in the absence of context, it is hard to differentiate
between the two.120 Law enforcement and courts are not always well
equipped to make this normative determination,121 and this Article
therefore argues that differentiating between ethical and unethical
hackers depends on whether the hacker in question exploited a
vulnerability and whether procedures of vulnerability disclosure
were followed. This will be further discussed in Section IV.
a. White Hat
White-hat hackers are security researchers whose main
motivation is to improve software and hardware by revealing
vulnerabilities and security flaws and disclosing them in a way that
will ensure they are patched. White-hat hackers, when not employed
by the vendors themselves, are motivated only sometimes by
financial gain (the expectation of being monetarily rewarded); more
often they are motivated by the challenge, or by the genuine belief
that improving the quality of software and hardware will make
Internet security stronger.
For an illustration of how white hats are improving the
security of the broader Internet infrastructure, we can look to Mike
Lynn, a security researcher then affiliated with Internet Security
Systems, who discovered a serious software flaw in Cisco’s

118
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119
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routers.122 Although Lynn reported the vulnerability to Cisco, he
was still threatened with legal action because he planned on
presenting some of the information to his peers at a security
conference.123 The gravity of this flaw was characterized then as a
ticking bomb endangering the very backbone of the Internet.124
Certain commentators believe that the notion separating
white hats from other hackers is that white hats act under
authorization.125 Another distinction made in literature is based on
disclosure: hackers disclosing vulnerabilities directly to the vendor
are white hats, while those who publicize vulnerabilities to the
broader public are considered gray or black hats.126
Given that white hats’ motivation is primarily the drive to
enhance security, it seems unreasonable to subject these individuals
to legal liability, assuming that cybersecurity is in the interest of the
broader public and possibly the international community. It would
be best, therefore, to define white hats as hackers who seek to
improve security while minimizing possible harm to the vulnerable
target by neither exploiting the vulnerability nor selling it to
malicious actors.127
b. Black Hat
Black-hat hacking is the exact opposite of the white-hat
approach. Indeed, black hats are hackers motivated by mischief or
profit rather than by actually fixing vulnerabilities and security
flaws.128 The ability to anonymize one’s identity on the Internet
allows for the proliferation of black hat hackers (or
“cybercriminals”), which lowers the risks of detection and
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prosecution compared to the physical world.129 Data suggest that
law enforcement is usually reluctant to investigate, apprehend, and
prosecute cybercriminals, given that hackers often reside overseas,
which presents challenges with regard to jurisdiction and gathering
evidence.130
Certain commentators make the argument that even though
black hats are essentially cybercriminals, the law should still allow
them to operate freely, since they can expose flaws and
vulnerabilities that could have been exploited in more harmful ways,
such as through terrorism or state-sponsored attacks.131 However,
the analysis in this Article will exclude black-hat hackers, since their
primary intention is not enhancing security.
c. Gray Hat
Hackers’ ethics and motivations are not binary but rather
could be placed somewhere on the black–white continuum. The gray
area in which hackers operate with unclear motivations is fittingly
labeled as “gray hat.”132 As an example, gray hats will still identify
vulnerabilities, but, rather than disclosing them to the vendor, they
might sell them to governments, intelligence agencies, or law
enforcement authorities.133 The buyer, in turn, uses the vulnerability
for a variety of purposes, such as for espionage, military, or law
enforcement ends.134 The primary intention of gray hats is not
necessarily enhancing security, although that could be one
motivation – it is the desire to monetize vulnerabilities by selling
them to official entities other than the vendor. It is difficult to tell
whether gray hats are included or excluded from the scope of the
argument in this Article, since that largely depends on their
129
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motivations and the precise nature of their activities. But assuming
the gray-hat hacker in question follows the procedure of
vulnerability disclosure and minimization of harm to third parties,
they ought to be in the clear in terms of legal liability.
d. The Vulnerability Market
When considering a freedom to hack, it is also important to
understand the incentives and realities of the “black-hat”
vulnerability market.135 In this market, hackers sell what are
typically known as “zero-day exploits,” meaning that vendors are
unaware of these vulnerabilities in their systems, and therefore the
chance of them getting patched is relatively low.136 Governments,
intelligence agencies, militaries, and cybercriminals find this black
market for vulnerabilities very appealing, and hackers who end up
selling vulnerabilities on that market believe that they are better off
doing so rather than disclosing them to the respective vendor.137
In the digital era, knowing of a vulnerability can be either a
weapon or a shield. Legalizing ethical hacking could be an incentive
to use that knowledge as a shield while reducing the likelihood that
researchers will sell vulnerabilities on the black market. In many
respects, the legal challenges demonstrated in Section III of this
Article create an incentive for researchers to sell vulnerabilities on
the black market, rather than to disclose them to the relevant parties,
for fear of legal jeopardy.138 The result makes individual users less
safe and creates a serious danger to the Internet as a whole,
considering that critical infrastructure and other public services may
be running software with exploitable vulnerabilities of which the
vendor has no knowledge.
At the same time, there are white-hat vulnerability markets,
which are often referred to as “bug bounty” programs, facilitated by
the vendors themselves. These markets create incentives for security
researchers by offering monetary rewards for reports of
135
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vulnerabilities made directly to the vendors under predetermined
conditions. Their purpose is to create a greater incentive for security
researchers to cooperate with vendors in order to prevent
vulnerabilities from being sold to potentially malicious actors –
criminal hackers and hostile governments.139
e. Accountability in the IoT Industry
Allowing ethical hackers to freely snoop for vulnerabilities
and flaws could facilitate a more accountable IoT industry:
manufacturers will patch reported vulnerabilities and attempt to
improve their products in a way that provides reasonable security,
and therefore data privacy, in order to avoid negative publicity. The
ethical hacking community is usually ahead of regulatory efforts to
set standards for industries, which potentially allows for a more
efficient and informed security atmosphere.
Regulatory agencies are slowly beginning to realize the
immense potential of exposing IoT vulnerabilities with the help of
the hacker community. This allows the industry to patch
vulnerabilities before malicious actors can exploit them for criminal,
political, or challenge-driven ends. The FTC has recently announced
an IoT challenge to “combat security vulnerabilities in home
devices,”140 offering a monetary reward for a tool that would
enhance IoT security in the form of a “physical device that the
consumer can add to his or her home network that would check and
install updates for other IoT devices on that home network, or it
might be an app or cloud-based service, or a dashboard or other user
interface.”141 However, this effort is still not actively encouraging
ethical hacking; rather, it encourages innovation. At the same time,
the FTC has also become an enforcer of cybersecurity and privacy,
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under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act.142 In the future, the FTC may
play an active part in ensuring that vendors address vulnerabilities
reported to them in a reasonable and timely manner.
III.

THE FREEDOM TO HACK

Individuals tinker with their devices for many reasons, including
for the challenge, to learn how the system works, or for diagnostic
and repair purposes.143 The freedom to tinker is important for
innovation and creativity, and, as the next sub-sections will analyze,
for the enhancement of security. Ensuring more ownership rights to
consumers of otherwise copyrighted objects is not only a legalistic
concept but an actual advocacy movement. For example, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a nonprofit organization, is a
strong proponent of a broad right to tinker, giving consumers more
flexibility and autonomy and protecting civil liberties in the digital
world. The ideology behind the movement is the belief that
technology helps develop and protect civil rights and liberties like
freedom of expression, privacy, and activism.144
Edward Felten notes that tinkering is not only a natural part of
property rights, which the owner possesses, but an exercise in
defining the relationship between the user and digital devices as “our
experience is mediated through these devices.”145 Although
tinkering is seemingly intuitively part of ownership, it has largely
not been formally legally recognized.146 When the law has addressed
tinkering, it has mostly been framed under the “permission culture,”
which permits tinkering only under very limited and narrow
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circumstances.147 Any deviation from this has generally been
considered a prohibited criminal activity.148
Court cases on the freedom to tinker reach as far as the U.S.
Supreme Court, which, in the recent Impression Products v.
Lexmark International, allowed consumers to tinker with and reuse
their printer cartridges without facing patent infringement charges,
highlighting that this freedom is part of “the rights that come along
with ownership”149 and that “the buyer is free and clear of an
infringement lawsuit” in such circumstances.150
Many have been advocating for a broad freedom to tinker
with otherwise copyright-protected hardware and software. The EFF
and other non-profit organizations have long pushed for a right to
tinker with rightfully owned hardware and software, framing it as a
broader “digital freedom.”151 In the past, consumers could reverseengineer and research their devices, but nowadays, Section 1201 of
the DMCA, which prohibits circumvention of Technical Protection
Measures (TPMs), as well as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) and wiretap laws have hampered that ability.152
The freedom to tinker encompasses many dimensions – it
allows for the intellectual freedom to learn more about different
objects in our lives.153 In this Article, I wish to introduce a subset of
the freedom to tinker – the freedom to hack.
By freedom to hack, I mean that the law, along with the
institutions that interpret, apply, and enforce it, should recognize the
benefits of security research (or ethical hacking). This mostly
includes research into vulnerabilities in software, hardware, and
networks with the intent of fixing these flaws and making the system
147
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less susceptible to malicious hacking and more secure overall.
Therefore, to some extent, security researchers or hacking-savvy
individuals should be able to hack and snoop for vulnerabilities and
weaknesses in order to make computer systems and networks
stronger by exposing these flaws. There is an ongoing debate over
how to disclose vulnerabilities and software flaws, and I will discuss
it further in Part IV of this Article.
The freedom to hack, only a small part of the freedom to
tinker, focuses on one important dimension – the right to expose and
disclose vulnerabilities to the vendor without being subjected to
civil or criminal penalties. This does not entail an unrestricted right
to hack. The law will still have to restrict hacking that causes serious
harm to third parties (such as privacy violations), which should be
treated under a criminal liability regime154 or tort law.155 Rather,
there should be an intellectual freedom to use methods of hacking to
fix and improve software and hardware, with a robust distinction
between constructive and destructive (i.e., exploitative) hacking.156
Many tech companies, and even governmental authorities,
actively encourage ethical hacking of their systems and provide
what are referred to as “bug bounties,” through which they invite
hackers to test their systems for vulnerabilities and to report any
possible flaws in exchange for monetary compensation.157 However,
154
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there are still certain boundaries imposed by bug bounty programs
in terms of what activities are allowed and prohibited.158 Even when
no compensation is guaranteed, or no official bug bounty program
is in place,159 many individual security researchers still engage in
bug hunting for a variety of reasons.160 This leads to some serious
tensions. Not all tech companies encourage an active hunt for bugs
in their software, and some would even be quite unwelcoming of
any vulnerabilities reported, whether due to reputational or costassociated reasons,161 and might claim such vulnerability collection
to be in violation of the law.162
With regard to possible circumvention liability, DMCA
prohibits circumvention of TPMs in copyrighted software, thus
possibly exposing security researchers to liability. At the same time,
with regard to criminal liability, the CFAA contains a fair number
of ambiguous concepts in relation to hacking that, if interpreted in a
according to the program’s rules). See also Microsoft Security TechCenter,
Microsoft
Bounty
Programs,
https://technet.microsoft.com/enus/library/dn425036.aspx (offering specific bug bounty programs to security
researchers); G. Burningham, The Rise of White Hat Hackers and the Bug Bounty
Ecosystem,
NEWSWEEK
(Jan.
31,
2016),
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/12/white-hat-hackers-keep-bug-bounty421357.html.
See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 397 (quoting Google’s vulnerability disclosure
program, which requires that “testing must not violate any law, or disrupt or
compromise any data that is not your own”).
158

159

Many companies do not have a vulnerability disclosure program. See Kirsch,
supra note 112, at 398.
160

See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1066 (listing reasons for security researchers
engaging in vulnerability hunting – “possible future remuneration, intellectual
satisfaction, peer recognition, ideological commitment, animus toward a
particular vendor, and expectations in a larger community of testers”).
161

See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1065.

162

See Jack Detsch, Influencers: Antihacking Law Obstructs Security Research,
THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (July 14, 2016), available at
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/PasscodeInfluencers/2016/0714/Influencers-Antihacking-law-obstructs-security-research
(comparing companies with established bug bounty programs to those who opted
to use the CFAA as a weapon against security researchers, providing the example
of Justin Shafer, who was arrested by the FBI for allegedly discovering a
vulnerability in dental office management software, allowing access to the
information of 22,000 patients, with the vendor arguing that Shafer’s actions
violated the CFAA).
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certain light, could expose legitimate security researchers to legal
jeopardy. Both the DMCA and CFAA challenges will be further
discussed in the following two sub-sections.
a. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
Computer software, just like any other creative work, is
protected under copyright law.163 In 1998, Congress enacted the
DMCA, creating a legal barrier for tinkerers. The DMCA
implemented the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaties by creating a legal regime against circumvention of
TPMs,164 protecting copyrighted works through the criminalization
of circumvention of these measures.165
Subsection 1201(a)(1)(A) of the U.S.C. reads, “No person
shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls
access to a work protected under this title.”166 In this way, Section
1201 restricts legitimate users from controlling their devices, since
the IoT environment is ultimately a collection of devices running on
copyrighted software. This would mean that smart vehicles,
pacemakers, insulin pumps, thermostats, and any other IoT devices
are covered by the Section on anti-circumvention, unless an explicit
exemption is provided by the DMCA, as discussed below.
Realizing that an absolute exclusion of the right to tinker is
unreasonable with respect to digital works, the DMCA also provides
certain exemptions from infringement liability, which will be
discussed in the following sections. Initially, however, the DMCA
provided a very narrow exemption from copyright infringement for

163

See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 581.

164

See Executive Summary Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Section 104
Report),
available
at
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_executive.html. Also, for
an elaborate analysis on the meaning of TPMs, see Ryan Iwahashi, How to
Circumvent Technological Protection Measures without Violating the DMCA: An
Examination of Technological Protection Measures under Current Legal
Standards, 26 BERK. TECH. L. J. 491 (2011).
165

See Samuelson, supra note 10, at 581.

166

See 17 U.S. Code § 1201(a)(1)(A).
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reverse-engineering of software for the purposes of
interoperability,167 encryption research,168 and security testing.169
In addition to the DMCA, users often agree to certain “terms
of service,”170 which create a contractual obligation vis-à-vis the
software or hardware vendor, creating another hurdle for users and,
therefore, security researchers.171 This private ordering restricts
security researchers because it grants vendors legal tools to stifle
security research, or any sort of tinkering with their products, purely
for business reasons, trumping any security concerns.172
In 2002, for example, HP was allegedly the first company to
use the DMCA as a weapon against security researchers.173 HP
threatened to file a lawsuit against software security company
SnoSoft, which had identified a security flaw in HP’s Tru64
operating system. HP threatened the researchers by noting that they
“could be fined up to $500,000 and imprisoned for up to five

167

See 17 U.S. Code § 1201(f)(1) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection
(a)(1)(A), a person who has lawfully obtained the right to use a copy of a computer
program may circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access
to a particular portion of that program for the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to achieve
interoperability of an independently created computer program with other
programs, and that have not previously been readily available to the person
engaging in the circumvention, to the extent any such acts of identification and
analysis do not constitute infringement under this title.”).
168

See U.S.C. § 1201(g) (“[I]it is not a violation of that subsection for a person to
circumvent a technological measure as applied to a copy, phonorecord,
performance, or display of a published work in the course of an act of good faith
encryption research.”).
169

See U.S.C. § 1201(j) (“[It] is not a violation of that subsection for a person to
engage in an act of security testing.” However, this exemption differs from the
newly adopted security research exemption, since it required “authorization from
the owner or operator” of the computer that was accessed.).
170

The government has previously argued that violating Terms of Service ought
to be considered a violation of the CFAA, since it is construed as “unauthorized
access.” See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
171

See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 8–9.

172

See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 8–9.

173

See Declan McCullagh, Security Warning Draws DMCA Threat, CNET (Aug.
1, 2012), https://www.cnet.com/news/security-warning-draws-dmca-threat.
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years”174 under the DMCA.175 Eventually, HP had to back down
from this threat, due to public scrutiny.176 Since then, the DMCA
has been used against academic researchers, such as when the
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) threatened
Professor Edward Felten. Felten’s paper dealt with breaking the
Secure Digital Music Initiative (SDMI) and incited the RIAA to
demand that Felten withdraw his paper from a conference. Felten
ultimately did so.177 Felten is just one example of many researchers
who, after disclosing vulnerabilities, receive cease-and-desist letters
from companies with threats of legal action and explicit demands to
discontinue any further security research due to the alleged illegality
of the act.178
1. The DMCA Exemption for Security Research
Copyright (or the right to exclude tinkerers) is not an absolute
legal concept, and certain interests, such as security and privacy,
should prevail when balanced against the need to protect the rights
of copyright owners.179 Therefore, the Library of Congress (LoC)
has a routine procedure – the triennial review – to assess whether
certain exemptions from copyright (and criminal) liability are
required in order to ensure that other important interests are
fulfilled.180 Before discussing the specific exemption within the
DMCA relevant to IoT, it is essential to understand the triennial
174

Id.

175

John Leyden, HP Withdraws DMCA Threat, THE REGISTER (Aug. 2, 2002),
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/08/02/hp_withdraws_dmca_threat.
176

Id.

177

See Freeman, supra note 289, at 129.

See Zack Whittaker, PwC Sends ‘Cease and Desist’ Letters to Researchers
Who
Found
Critical
Flaw,
ZDNET
(Dec.
12,
2016),
http://www.zdnet.com/article/pwc-sends-security-researchers-cease-and-desistletter-instead-of-fixing-security-flaw/.
178

179

See Helen Nissenbaum, Where Computer Security Meets National Security, 7
ETHICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 61, 62 (2005) (“Security deserves a place
alongside privacy, intellectual property, equity, and other values that have been
vigorously debated in light of developments in and application of digital
electronic information technologies.”)
180

See Arielle Singh, Agency Regulation in Copyright Law: Rulemaking Under
the DMCA and Its Broader Implications, 26 BERK. TECH. L. J. 527, 529 (2011)
(“When Congress drafted the DMCA, it recognized that it could not predict the
future technology landscape, and therefore, included the rulemaking process in
the statutory scheme to create flexibility”).
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process, as well as how the world of copyright slowly creeps into
other territories, such as information security.
The DMCA created a procedure of triennial review so that
potential exemptions to the DMCA could be proposed by the
broader public.181 Parties can claim that they are adversely affected
by the DMCA’s anti-circumvention rule, and, after public hearing
and comment, the Registrar of Copyrights submits
recommendations to the Librarian of Congress, who then determines
whether to approve the proposed exemptions to the rule.182 For
example, the Librarian has to assess, among other things, “the
impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works
has on criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research”183 and
“such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.”184 In
other words, the DMCA does not directly prescribe security as part
of what the Librarian has to consider when recognizing new
exemptions, but it gives the Librarian broad discretion.

181

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C) (“[T]he Librarian of Congress, upon the
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, who shall consult with the
Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the Department of
Commerce and report and comment on his or her views in making such
recommendation, shall make the determination in a rulemaking proceeding for
purposes of subparagraph (B) of whether persons who are users of a copyrighted
work are, or are likely to be in the succeeding 3-year period, adversely affected
by the prohibition under subparagraph (A) in their ability to make noninfringing
uses under this title of a particular class of copyrighted works. In conducting such
rulemaking, the Librarian shall examine—
(i) the availability for use of copyrighted works;
(ii) the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preservation, and
educational purposes;
(iii) the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of technological
measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
(iv) the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the market for
or value of copyrighted works; and
(v) such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate.”).
182

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C).

183

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii).

184

See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v).
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In 2015 the LoC authorized an exemption that was no less than
a breakthrough for the computer security community.185 The
exemption reads as follows:
(i) Computer programs, where the circumvention is
undertaken on a lawfully acquired device or machine on
which the computer program operates solely for the
purpose of good-faith security research and does not
violate any applicable law, including without limitation the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, as amended and
codified in title 18, United States Code; and provided,
however, that, except as to voting machines, such
circumvention is initiated no earlier than 12 months after
the effective date of this regulation, and the device or
machine is one of the following:
(A) A device or machine primarily designed for use by
individual consumers (including voting machines);
(B) A motorized land vehicle; or
(C) A medical device designed for whole or partial
implantation in patients or a corresponding personal
monitoring system, that is not and will not be used by
patients or for patient care.186

In addition to what could be considered an IoT device – a
“device or machine designed to be used by individual consumers” –
the exemption adds two standalone categories: motorized land
vehicles and medical devices.
These two sub-categories are there for a reason. Any flaws
and vulnerabilities in these two types of devices could potentially be
deadly or at least pose a serious danger to the safety of their users.187
185

See Jack Detsch, The Legal Exemption Making Life Easier For Ethical
Hackers, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Security-culture/2016/1207/Thelegal-exemption-making-life-easier-for-ethical-hackers.
186

37 CFR § 201.40 - Exemptions to prohibition against circumvention, § 201.40
(b)(7).
187

The FDA in its premarket cybersecurity guidelines for medical devices
categorizes five types of risks – negligible (inconvenience or temporary
discomfort); minor (results in temporary injury or impairment not requiring
professional medical intervention); serious (results in injury or impairment
requiring professional medical intervention); critical (results in permanent
impairment or life-threatening injury), and; catastrophic (results in patient death).

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE
4/26/2018

FREEDOM TO HACK
Medical devices, including insulin pumps, pacemakers, implantable
cardioverter defibrillators, and glucose monitors, are prone to
software flaws, posing an actual and immediate danger to the
patients using them.188 Only recently the FDA reported that certain
implantable cardiac devices are vulnerable to attacks, which could
allow an unauthorized user to control the device and exfiltrate data
from it.189 Surprisingly, medical devices are ridden with
vulnerabilities; as already reported, certain insulin pumps190 and
pacemakers191 are vulnerable to hacking.
Motorized land vehicles are increasingly computerized and
connected to the Internet, creating a whole host of vulnerabilities
that may be fatal. The automobile industry has yet to realize the
many risks associated with such development in the architecture of
cars.192 In fact, Wired reported that security researchers were able to
hack into the entertainment-system computer of a Jeep, letting
hackers command the vehicle – including steering and braking.193
This led to Chrysler recalling its 1.4 million vulnerable vehicles in
order to patch the bug.194 The fact that smart vehicles often have

See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content of
Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices, at
17
(Dec.
28,
2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf.
188

Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, 378.
189

FDA, Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities Identified in St. Jude Medical's
Implantable Cardiac Devices and Merlin@home Transmitter: FDA Safety
Communication,
(Jan.
9,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm535843.htm.
190

Jim Finkle, J&J Warns Diabetic Patients: Insulin Pumps Vulnerable to
Hacking, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnsonjohnson-cyber-insulin-pumps-e-idUSKCN12411L.
191

See Khandelwal, supra note 105.

192

See U.C. Berkeley School of Information Report, supra note 33, at 3.

Andy Greenberg, Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway – With Me in
It, WIRED (July 21, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotelykill-jeep-highway.
193

194

Andy Greenberg, After Jeep Hack, Chrysler Recalls 1.4M Vehicles for Bug
Fix, WIRED (July 24, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/07/jeep-hack-chryslerrecalls-1-4m-vehicles-bug-fix.
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more than a hundred million lines of code strengthens the notion that
security research is essential for vehicles.195
There are a few shortcomings to this DMCA exemption that
could further stifle certain types of security research. While the
exemption does give significant leeway to security researchers who
circumvent the software of IoT devices designed for “use by
individual consumers,” it also overlooks an important subgroup of
IoT devices – those that are not used by individual consumers, such
as those used by the government or by organizations.196 The DMCA
exemption does not give guidance on what constitutes a device used
by “individual consumers” except that it includes voting machines
within that category. This could potentially stifle security research
with regard to devices that were not necessarily designed for
individual consumers’ use.
i.

Good Faith

The DMCA exemption is conditioned upon “good faith,”
which is tricky to define in the context of security research,
particularly on behalf of unaffiliated hackers. The exemption
provides that security testing
. . . means accessing a computer program solely for
purposes of good-faith testing, investigation and/or
correction of a security flaw or vulnerability, where
such activity is carried out in a controlled
environment designed to avoid any harm to
individuals or the public, and where the
information derived from the activity is used
primarily to promote the security or safety of the
class of devices or machines on which the
computer program operates, or those who use such
devices or machines, and is not used or maintained
195

See David Zax, Many Cars Have a Hundred Million Lines of Code, M.I.T.
TECH. REV. (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/508231/manycars-have-a-hundred-million-lines-of-code.
196

See Erik Stallman, A Qualified Win for Cybersecurity Researchers in DMCA
Triennial Rulemaking, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Oct. 27,
2015),
https://cdt.org/blog/a-qualified-win-for-cybersecurity-researchers-indmca-triennial-rulemaking/ (arguing that devices “primarily designed for the use
by individual consumers” excludes a significant portion of devices not used by
individual consumers).

DRAFT—DO NOT CITE
4/26/2018

FREEDOM TO HACK
in a manner
infringement.197

that

facilitates

copyright

This requirement limits the security research exemption to
circumvention efforts intended for testing, investigation, and
correction of vulnerabilities and flaws. It also requires a controlled
environment in order to prevent harm to third parties. The
information obtained through the security research should be used
primarily to promote security.
These requirements implicate security research in several
ways. First, they exclude security researchers who happen to
stumble upon a vulnerability or who identify a possible fix to a flaw
without intending to do so. Recently, an “accidental hero” offered a
kill-switch to the global ransomware “WannaCry,” but according to
him finding a solution to WannaCry had not been his intention
initially.198 This could stifle vulnerability reporting by researchers
whose intentions at the outset are not to promote security. Second, a
the DMCA does not define “controlled environment,” therefore
potentially excluding security researchers whose environments
would not be considered “controlled” and possibly allowing vendors
to abuse this requirement against unaffiliated security researchers.
The introduction of cloud computing as a central part of the IoT
ecosystem is another exacerbating factor to the notion of “controlled
environment.”199 Third, the exemption provides that information
gathered from exempted security research should be used
“primarily” to enhance security and safety. However, this
potentially opens the door to security research that crosses from a
white- or gray-hat world into black hat-territory, where motivations
are usually malicious.200
Lastly, these requirements provide a glimpse into the
phenomenon of copyright bleeding over into cybersecurity,201
197

17 U.S.C. § 1201(j)(1).

Nadia Khomami & Olivia Solon, ‘Accidental Hero’ Halts Ransomware Attack
and Warns: This Is Not Over, GUARDIAN (May 13, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/13/accidental-hero-findskill-switch-to-stop-spread-of-ransomware-cyber-attack.
198

199

See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1091.

200

See Zetter (Hacker Lexicon), supra note 133.

201

See Paul Ohm & Black Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has
Software, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1686 (2016) (“Suddenly, the Copyright
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meaning that the requirement is not necessarily in line with the way
ethical hackers actually operate in the vulnerability detection space.
This is more of an institutional problem, in which the question is
whether the organs involved in the DMCA triennial review process
are actually well equipped to address the security issues within their
purview.
ii.

Opposition by U.S. Regulatory Agencies

Agencies who commented on the proposed exemption
during the triennial review process had several reservations. While
the National Telecommunication and Information Administration
(NTIA) supported the aforementioned exemption to the prohibition
on circumvention,202 other agencies, such as the FDA, DOT, and
EPA, strongly opposed and had significant reservations to
exempting computer programs for good-faith security research.203
The main thrust of these agencies’ argument is that security research
into computer programs could actually compromise security and
privacy. As certain opponents noted, “‘fixing’ of medical devices
without FDA or manufacturer permission would risk patient safety
because it would ‘enable others to bypass proper regulatory
controls.’”204
The FDA, for example, opposed the exemption because
every medical device has to undergo FDA pre-market approval,205
Office found itself at the center of a full[-]fledged, multiagency debate over the
extent to which code regulation might be necessary not just for copyright policy
reasons, but for environmental, traffic, health, and various other noncopyright
policy reasons as well.”).
See Sixth Triennial Section 1201 Rulemaking – Recommendations of the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration to the Register of
Copyrights
(Sept.
18,
2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/1201/2015/2015_NTIA_Letter.pdf (“[T]o the extent
that there is a copyright interest, NTIA believes that security research is
noninfringing and constitutes fair use.”).
202

203

Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 313.
204

Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 293.
205

See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content
of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices
(Dec.
28,
2016),
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance
/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf.
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and unrestricted meddling with or changes to software in medical
devices would put patients “at increased risk from bad faith attempts
to modify devices during the period required to develop and obtain
[FDA] approval for the change.”206 As a result, the FDA, the agency
responsible for the safety and privacy of medical devices, would not
be able to support any exemption that would compromise that
responsibility.
FDA guidance on Premarket Submissions for Management
of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices contains certain suggestions
for vendors of medical devices, such as limiting access to trusted
users, ensuring trusted content, and planning for detection, response,
and recovery from security compromises.207 However, this guidance
is only a recommendation for effective cybersecurity management.
Though vendors submitting medical devices for FDA premarket
review will want to implement these recommendations to ensure
FDA approval, they are by no means legally binding.208 This
demonstrates that even the seemingly strictest agency in terms of
IoT security provides only recommended guidelines to vendors,
highlighting the need for external security research due to the
increasing volume of vulnerabilities.209
b. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)
Federal and state statutes have outlawed unauthorized access
to computers.210 While each state statute is slightly different, they
all share some basic concepts.211 The CFAA of 1984 criminalizes
206

Section 1201 Rulemaking: Sixth Triennial Proceeding October 2015
Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, p. 293.
207

See Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff - Content
of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices,
at
4
(Oct.
2,
2014),
available
at
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/medicaldevices/deviceregulationandguidance/g
uidancedocuments/ucm356190.pdf.
208

See FDA Premarket Content, supra note 207, at 2.

209

See
FDA,
Cybersecurity
(last
updated
Mar.
3,
2017),
https://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DigitalHealth/ucm373213.htm
(“This
vulnerability increases as medical devices are increasingly connected to the
Internet, hospital networks, and to other medical devices.”).
210

ORIN KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW 29–30 (3rd Ed., 2012).

211

See Kerr, supra note 210, at 30.
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certain potentially harmful computer-related activities. Since its
enactment, the CFAA has been amended ten times, and each time
its scope has been expanded.212 The CFAA is often said to be one of
the most “far-reaching criminal laws in the Unites States Code” due
to its broad language and enforcement.213 This vagueness raises
constitutionality questions, particularly in the context of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine,214 exerting “pressure on courts to adopt
narrow interpretations of access and authorization.”215 The statute
was inspired by the common-law trespass doctrine, which does not
always fit perfectly with the realities of the Internet.216
The central provision applicable to security research is
located in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), which deals with unauthorized
access to protected computers and criminalizes the obtaining of
“information from any protected computer”217 through intentional
access to “a computer without authorization” or exceeding
“authorized access.”218 The concepts of “access” and
“authorization” have been the subject of substantial debate.219 This
has led to confusion among computer users, security researchers,
and even law enforcement.220 Experts admit that this provision has
the lowest thresholds and is therefore applicable to a broad subset of
212

See Thompson, supra note 13, at 560.

213

Orin Kerr, Vagueness and Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010).
United States v. Williams, 128 S. Ct. 1830, 1845 (2008) (“Vagueness doctrine
is an outgrowth not of the First Amendment, but of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. A conviction fails to comport with due process if the statute
under which it is obtained fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages
seriously discriminatory enforcement.”).
214

215

See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1572.

216

See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 393.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C). The CFAA also prohibits obtaining “information
contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer as
defined in section 1602(n) of title 15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting
agency on a consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.).” (18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(2)(A)] and “information from
any department or agency of the United States” [18 U.S. Code § 1030(a)(2)(B)]).
217

218

18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).

See Orin Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003).
219

220

See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 392–93.
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online activities.221 It would be outside the scope of this Article to
reiterate the debate over the precise contours of authorization and
access. The focus would be on how security research is stifled by
the prohibition on unauthorized access.
The scope of unauthorized access largely criminalizes any
instance of interstate hacking222 and encompasses every Internetconnected device within the scope of “protected computer,”223
including anything that has a “microchip or that permits digital
storage.”224 The CFAA defines “computer” in a broad manner and
excludes only a few devices, such as “an automated typewriter or
typesetter, a portable hand held calculator, or other similar
device.”225 Since some security research requires the use of hacking
methods, this overbroad approach stifles research into
vulnerabilities in such critical systems as voting machines,226
resulting in adversaries learning about these vulnerabilities before
the vendor can identify them.227 Even at present, security
researchers at the renowned DefCon hacking conference managed

221

See Kerr, supra note 210, at 78.

222

See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1567.

223

See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1571.

224

See Kerr, supra note 213, at 1571.

18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) defines a “computer” as “an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data storage facility or
communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a
portable hand held calculator, or other similar device.”
225

See Brian Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines Are Scarily Easy
Targets, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americasvoting-machines-arent-ready-election (explaining that vulnerable voting
machines are very much a reality, giving the example of WinVote, Virginia’s
voting machines that were vulnerable to remote hacking – “anyone within a half
mile could have modified every vote undetected.”).
226

227

See, e.g., Zapotosky, Demirijian, Homeland Security Official: Russian
Government Actors Tried To Hack Election Systems In 21 States, WASHINGTON
POST (Jun. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/homeland-security-official-russian-government-actors-potentially-triedto-hack-election-systems-in-21-states/2017/06/21/33bf31d4-5686-11e7-ba90f5875b7d1876_story.html.
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to hack into several voting machines in less than ninety minutes.228
This reveals the need to rebalance the goals of criminal law and
cybersecurity.
The over-broadness of computer crime statutes is not a
problem in only U.S. law; it has also been a matter of concern in
security research communities overseas. For instance, in the UK, the
Computer Misuse Act of 1990 was recently amended to criminalize
the “creation, supply or application of ‘hacker tools’ for use in
computer misuse offences.”229 This has significantly broadened the
scope of application of the Act, making ethical hackers concerned
about potential legal jeopardy.230
The threat posed to security researchers by the CFAA is far
from theoretical. In 2002, Bret McDanel, an employee of Tornado
Development, Inc., was convicted and sentenced to 16 months in
federal prison for disclosing a serious vulnerability in the onlinemessaging product offered by his employer.231 At first, McDanel
reported the vulnerability to his employer, but the employer never
patched it.232 As a last resort, McDanel e-mailed as many as 5,600
Tornado customers to inform them of the unpatched vulnerability.
As a result, the Department of Justice indicted McDanel, arguing
that his actions knowingly caused “the transmission of a program,
information, code, or command, and[,] as a result of such conduct,
intentionally cause[d] damage without authorization[] to a protected
computer.”233
The DOJ has since admitted that prosecuting McDanel was
a mistake; it filed a motion to reverse the conviction in the Ninth
228

See Adam Lusher, Hackers Breached Defences of US Voting Machines in Less
Than
90
Minutes,
INDEPENDENT
(July
31,
2017),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-electionhacking-russia-russian-hackers-cyberattack-donald-trump-voting-machines-defcon-a7868536.html.
STEFAN FAFINSKI, COMPUTER MISUSE – RESPONSES, REGULATION AND THE
LAW 76 (2009).
229

A testimony by UK-based technician read, “That’s the end of penetration
testing. Why would I risk ending up in jail for doing my job? It’s madness. It takes
away the incentive for making systems secure and plays right into the hands of
criminals.” Fafinski, supra note 229, at 76.
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See Freeman, supra note 27, at 129.

232

See Freeman, supra note 27, at 129.
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Circuit Court of Appeals, noting that his actions had not indicated
an intent to harm his employer and could have potentially pressured
his employer to fix the vulnerability, thus protecting the privacy of
customers using the messaging product.234 The relationship between
intent and harm is a critical one, since it could exclude security
researchers from the scope of the CFAA if unauthorized access can
be shown to lack intent to cause harm.235 Since the CFAA does not
require a showing of scienter in relation to the harm, it
“overcriminalizes hacking activity that involves mere access and
inadvertent minor damage”236 and “effectively establishes strict
liability beyond the intentional access . . . regardless of moral
culpability.”237
However, it is not only hacking that is criminalized; access
to portions of the Web that the owner did not design for public
access is also generally deemed illegal. These were the facts in
United States v. Aurenheimer, where the defendant, Andrew
Aurenheimer, was charged under the CFAA for “unauthorized
access” because he revealed an AT&T-owned URL that contained
private account data belonging to as many as 100,000 iPad users.238
Such an approach to the concept of unauthorized access puts
security researchers at risk not only for using hacking techniques but
also for pursuing benign activities online that the vendor or owner
deems unfriendly. This leads to “authorization,” a legal term of art
within the CFAA, being de facto defined by tech companies rather
234

See United States v. Bret McDanel, (Motion for Reversal of Conviction) C.A.
No. 03-50135, available at http://www.steptoe.com/publications/273a.pdf
(“[T]he government believes it was an error to argue that defendant intended an
“impairment” to the integrity of Tornado’s computer system… instead, the
evidence established that defendant informed Tornado’s customers --- the people
whose data may have been vulnerable to unauthorized access --- about the
vulnerability, an action that could have brought about repair of the problem.”).
Similarly, in United States v. Morris, Morris argued that he had no intent to cause
damage when he created the Morris worm, although he did have intent to access
a protected computer in an unauthorized manner (the double scienter question)
which caused a considerable amount of damage to many computers affected by
the Morris worm, see United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991).
235

See Thompson, supra note 13, at 562.
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See Thompson, supra note 13, at 562.
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See Thompson, supra note 13, at 568.
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See United States v. Aurenheimer, No. 11-CR-470, 2012 WL 5389142, at *1
(D.N.J. Oct. 26, 2012).
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than by Congress, courts, or law enforcement authorities.239 This
problematic breadth is paired with outdated notions of sentencing,
discussed in the following subsection.
1. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines can provide insight into
how courts current approach punishment for computer crimes.240
The Guidelines provide for harsher punishments for property crimes
where the criminal act causes great economic loss.241 In the context
of computer crimes, such a loss includes, among other things, “the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment,
and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its
condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost . . . .”242 This
punishment model does not take into account beneficial security
research, and it ignores the far costlier alternative of malicious
exploitation of vulnerabilities.243 Losses also include the cost of
patching a vulnerability, which would have taken place even in
absence of the crime.244
The Guidelines impose still greater punishment if the target
computer belonged to critical infrastructure.245 The exploitation of
vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure computers, such as those
intended to manage power and gas, transportation, national security,
and public health, could result in devastating disruption effects. At
the same time, if critical infrastructure and other non-critical
239

See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 399.

240

U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual (2016).

241

U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 2B1.1(b)(1) (2016).

242

2B1.1(3)(v)(III) U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual § 2B1.1(3)(v)(III) (2016)
(“reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense,
conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or
information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost
incurred, or other damages incurred because of interruption of service.”).
243

On the lack of instrumentality in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, see
Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2453 (2006) (“[C]urrent U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines do not sufficiently take instrumental concerns into
account.”).
244

See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2454 (citing Creative Computing v.
Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935–56 (where the court ruled that routine
maintenance and updating would be assessed as part of the damages)).
245

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2B1.1(b)(18)(A).
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computers operate on that same vulnerable software, it would be
preferable to target the latter from a risk standpoint, however, that is
not always possible when critical infrastructure computers operate
on their own software and systems.246 Therefore, the Guidelines
should also consider the degree of benefit of the act in question, by
comparing it to the full potential of exploiting the vulnerability,
which could be far more devastating than the prosecuted crime.247
IV.

CREATING A SECURE
THROUGH LAW

HYPERCONNECTED

WORLD

If law, and the institutions creating, enforcing, and interpreting
it, were to recognize the benefits of ethical hacking, this could help
resolve many systematic shortcomings in what experts call the
“security theater.”248
First, incentivizing ethical hackers to report vulnerabilities to the
vendor would decrease the overall number of unpatched
vulnerabilities, narrowing down the opportunities for adversaries to
attack the IoT ecosystem. This could also pressure the IoT industry
to create secure devices, as companies will attempt to avoid public
shaming based on flaws in their software detected by ethical
hackers.249 This will by no means prevent malicious hacking
entirely; it may, however, decrease its likelihood, by increasing the
costs associated with mounting a cyber-attack and enabling more
targeted and efficient law enforcement efforts to deal with the most
serious offenses. This could be achieved through clear distinctions
between malicious and benevolent actors and through certain
246

See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2456.

247

See Anonymous, supra note 15, at 2455 (“[P]unishments should encourage
attacks that fall shortest of their full destructive potential, at the very least by
taking into account the gap between potential and actual damage during
sentencing.”).
Similarly, Bruce Schneier refers to a related phenomenon as “security theater,”
which is “security measures that make people feel more secure without doing
anything to actually improve their security.” Bruce Schneier, Beyond Security
Theater,
SCHNEIER
ON
SECURITY
(Nov.
2009),
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2009/11/beyond_security_thea.html.
248
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Anonymous, Immunizing the Internet, Or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Worm, 119(8) HARV. L. REV. 2442, 2450 (2006) (“media coverage,
user complaints can prompt vendors to take action” otherwise, “vendors would be
more complacent”).
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legislative and administrative adjustments, such as clarification of
the boundaries of the CFAA and DMCA in relation to security
research.
Second, there should be consensus on how to disclose
vulnerabilities in an acceptable manner. At present, the philosophy
on disclosure is highly fragmented and context-dependent. In The
Hacker’s Aegis, Derek Bambauer and Oliver Day recommend that
security researchers adhere to five rules of thumb, in exchange for
immunity from civil liability: report the vulnerability to the vendor
first, do not sell it, test on the researcher’s own system, do not
weaponized it, and create a trail.250 While these rules are certainly
helpful, there is still a need to revisit the fundamental disagreement
over disclosure practices.
Finally, allowing security researchers to snoop around for
vulnerabilities is insufficient on its own; important modifications
should support efforts to patch flaws in software. Such
modifications might include requiring that vendors embed built-in
patchability into IoT devices, using privacy tort law to address
potential externalities associated with security research, tackling
vendors who employ the “security by obscurity” practice, and
empowering the FTC to enforce cybersecurity and vulnerability
management practices against rogue vendors. These modifications
are required in order to achieve a truly secure IoT ecosystem, one
that encourages vendor accountability and cooperation.
a. Distinguishing Malicious from Benign Hackers
The main difficulty with the proposition that security
research should not be impeded by legal hurdles is that it is
somewhat burdensome to draw a clear line between benign and
malicious activities in cyberspace.251 This difficulty mainly arises
because hackers use the same tools regardless of their motives.

250

See Bambauer, supra note 34, at 1088.
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See generally Larisa Long, Profiling Hackers, SANS Institute InfoSec Reading
Room
(Jan.
26,
2012),
https://www.sans.org/readingroom/whitepapers/hackers/profiling-hackers-33864 (“While the law is clear
concerning hacking, the definition gets a bit fuzzy among the general population
and even computer professionals. Added into this mix are the Gray Hats, or
Ethical Hackers, who blur the line between White and Black.”).
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There are factors, however, that distinguish between
malicious and benign hackers, though they are highly dependent on
the specific case and facts in question. It is one thing to discover a
vulnerability, and it is quite a different thing to exploit that
vulnerability to its full disruptive and destructive potential.252 The
red line here should be focused on weaponization and exploitation
– whether the hacker simply identified a flaw and reported it
responsibly to the vendor (ethical hacking), or whether she or he
exploited it to cause damage (malicious hacking). This is a case-bycase assessment that should focus on whether the hacker used tools
and techniques that caused minimal harm given the specific
circumstances.
The central part of this assessment is the nature of the
vulnerability. Some vulnerabilities allow access to certain protected
information; others grant full administrator privileges; and some
could even result in malfunction or destruction of the hacked device.
The dividing line is between reasonable tools and effects of
vulnerability research versus unreasonable techniques that cause
damage beyond what is required to identify the flaw.
Weaponization of a vulnerability can indicate that a hacker
is motivated not by a desire to fix flaws but rather by a wish to
monetize or exploit the vulnerability in a manner that causes damage
to the unsecure computer systems and networks and thus violates
the law. However, weaponizing a vulnerability (creating a
mechanism to exploit the vulnerability) requires a tremendous
amount of time and resources, and such a substantial activity would
make it easier for law enforcement to determine whether the act in
question is malicious or benign, since the effort of weaponizing is
not trivial.253
Supplementing factors include whether hackers cooperate
with law enforcement (if it comes to that), whether they disclose
252

See Paul Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for
Cyber Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 244 (2013) (“[A]s an alternative
to engaging in ‘responsible disclosure,’ a researcher could instead ‘exploit’ or
weaponize the 0-day vulnerability.”).
253

See Paul Stockton, Michele Golabek-Goldman, Curbing the Market for Cyber
Weapons, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 245 (2013) (noting that “transforming
a vulnerability into a weaponized exploit may require significant investments of
time, money, and resources”).
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their actions and findings to the vendor, and whether they provide
as much information as possible to relevant agencies, if needed – for
example, reporting a pacemaker vulnerability to the FDA, or using
US-CERT as an intermediary in the process. At least one
commentator argues that if a security researcher notifies the vendor
within 24–48 hours of his or her activities, it should provide a “safeharbor” in terms of CFAA liability.254
b. Legislative and Administrative Efforts to Date
Congress has realized the importance of ethical hacking on
many occasions, primarily in proposed legislation initiatives.
Recently, the Senate introduced a bipartisan “Internet of Things
(IoT) Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017” bill, proposing,
among other things, to amend the CFAA and DMCA to allow goodfaith security research of “Internet-connected device(s)” used by a
“department or agency of the United States.”255 The bill expands the
notion of security research, which is already part of the DMCA
exemption, to IoT devices used by the U.S. government and its
agencies, removing the legal barriers if researchers follow a clear set
of guidelines.256 This addresses part of the critique this Article
makes of the current DMCA exemption for security research, which
excludes a whole subset of Internet-connected devices.
The Bill also requests that IoT contractors certify that their
devices do not have any known vulnerabilities and that they are
patchable and follow industry-standard protocols.257 More
importantly, the Bill empowers the National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD) to create guidelines, in consultation
with security researchers, for vulnerability disclosure. At present,
and as discussed below, there is no uniform federally mandated
vulnerability disclosure procedure, and creating authoritative rules
in this area is of the utmost importance.258 However, this Bill creates
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See Kirsch, supra note 112, at 400.
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See Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017 (hereinafter
“IoT Bill”) (115th Cong.), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3911338Internet-of-Things-Cybersecurity-Improvement-Act.html.
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See id. at § 3.
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only minimal standards of cybersecurity and includes exceptions
that still leave many potential gaps.
Additionally, in response to the Jeep hack, the Senate
introduced a bill that deals specifically with vehicle security by
requiring isolation of critical software systems from other internal
networks as well as penetration testing by security analysts and
onboard systems to detect malicious activity.259 Considering that
vehicle software may have as many as a hundred million lines of
code, substantially more than other software, this vehicle-specific
bill makes a lot of sense.260 This demonstrates the magnitude of
potential individuals (and vehicles) affected by unpatched bugs, the
fact that it was not the vehicle manufacturer who identified the
vulnerability, and that Congress realizes the looming threat of
Internet-connected vehicles running flawed software. This has also
led the vehicle industry to invest more in cybersecurity efforts.
Volkswagen, for example, has established its very own
cybersecurity firm with the goal of preventing hacking.261
Recently, Congress, realizing how integral ethical hacking is
to overall cybersecurity, has attempted to come up with a resolution
that proactively promotes ethical hacking,262 including a bill
creating a bug bounty program for vulnerabilities disclosed in a
“Hack the Department of Homeland Security” program.263 Other
259

Security and Privacy in Your Car Act of 2015 (114th Cong.)
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1806/all-info.
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See Gelles, Tabuchi, and Dolan, Complex Car Software Becomes the Weak
Spot
Under
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Hood,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sep.
27,
2015)
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/27/business/complex-car-software-becomesthe-weak-spot-under-the-hood.html.
261
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PCWORLD
(Sept.
14,
2016),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/3120283/volkswagen-is-founding-a-newcybersecurity-firm-to-prevent-car-hacking.html.
See Morgan Chalfant, Dem Pushes ‘Ethical Hacking’ Resolution, THE HILL
(July 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/342803-dem-pushesethical-hacking-resolution (Rep. Lou Correa (D-Calif.) introduced a resolution
that would allow ethical hackers, who hack into computer networks and systems
with the intent of identifying security vulnerabilities without malicious or criminal
intent).
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See Maggie Hassan & Rob Portman, Why We’re Encouraging Ethical Hackers
to Try and Hack the Department of Homeland Security, TIME (Jun. 30, 2017),
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departments announced similar challenges for private citizens,
including the Department of Defense (“Hack the Pentagon”),264
which also contacted the well-known vulnerability coordination
platform HackerOne265 in order to facilitate a vulnerability
disclosure program for private security researchers.266
c. Clarifying CFAA and DMCA Boundaries
Clarifying the boundaries of CFAA and DMCA as
pertaining to security researchers is immensely important.267 The
CFAA’s strict liability for access “without authorization” is
certainly a major threat to security researchers. At the same time, it
discourages talented researchers from engaging responsibly with
vendors. Although there have been many calls to reform the CFAA
in recent years,268 this Article advances a proposal focused on the
DOJ, the prosecuting authority of the CFAA. The DOJ already
acknowledged in the McDanel case that it had erred when it
prosecuted an employee exposing a vulnerability in his employer’s
product.269 This, however, is only one individual case and does not
necessarily provide guidance for potential future prosecutions of
security researchers engaged in vulnerability snooping.

“one of the best ways to protect places like DHS is actually to recruit hackers to
attempt to hack into its own systems and networks”) (citing Hack DHS Act,
H.R.2774 (115th Cong.), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/115thcongress/house-bill/2774/text?r=21).
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https://www.hackerone.com/resources/hack-the-pentagon (noting that the first
vulnerability was reported 13 minutes after the launch of the program).
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See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931), (noting that creation of
new crimes requires giving “fair warning . . . in a language that the common world
will understand”).
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See Orin Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH
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2013),
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The recommendation, therefore, is to facilitate publicly
available CFAA enforcement guidelines in the context of security
research. This would ensure that white- and gray hat-hackers
engaging in vulnerability research are aware of the boundaries and
limitations and of their rights and duties. For example, a simple port
scan, a basic operation used to learn about services running on a
computer and entryways into the system, could lead to prosecution
under the CFAA.270 While this is clearly absurd in the eyes of
security researchers, law enforcement authorities may not have the
same perspective. This is just one example of the many basic
activities of security researchers on which the CFAA should
elaborate, particularly in light of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s
statement during the passage of Section 1030(a)(2) clarifying that
“mere observation of the data” is enough to qualify as “obtaining
information,” a constitutive element of the crime of unauthorized
access.271 This would place security researchers who do not copy,
exfiltrate, or steal protected information under potential criminal
liability.
Recently, the DOJ released to the public a Memorandum by
the Attorney General setting guidelines for consistent law
enforcement of “Computer Crime Matters.”272 While the
Memorandum does acknowledge that federal criminal statutes
“have not kept pace uniformly with developments in technology,” it
does not acknowledge the emerging unsecure IoT ecosystem and the
role of ethical hackers. The Memorandum offers certain factors for
consideration in CFAA prosecutions, such as the sensitivity of the
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Though, a U.S. District Court in Moulton v. VC3 ruled that port scan is not in
violation of the CFAA, its decision does not have binding authority. See Moulton
v. VC3, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19916 (N.D. Ga.).
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Senate Judiciary Committee Report No. 99 432, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 6–7
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need not be proved in order to establish a violation of this subsection.”).
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See Office of the Attorney General, Memorandum to the United States
Attorneys and Assistant Attorney Generals for the Criminal and National Security
Divisions – Intake and Charging Policy for Computer Crime Matters (Sep. 11,
2014),
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computer system affected, national security concerns, and any nexus
to a larger criminal endeavor.
The DMCA exemption for security research also raises
questions in relation to scope and the meanings of key terms. Since
exemptions expire after three years, requiring renewed submission
of petitions for exemptions, that could be an opportunity to further
clarify what a security research exemption means, especially when
it comes to devices not for individual consumer use, and the
meaning of “controlled environment” in the age of cloud
computing.273
d. Requiring Built-In Patchability in IoT Devices
The important work of security researchers in the field of IoT
security will not bear any fruit if IoT devices cannot be patched in
the first place. While computer users generally have control over
what they install, this is not necessarily the case in the IoT context,
where users have limited control over security features and have to
trust the vendor to ensure up-to-date and secure software. This
means that regulators would have to require vendors to manufacture
IoT devices that can be patched if security flaws are discovered. The
reality is that the market does not incentivize vendors to do so; we
must therefore consider a regulatory approach.274
Patchability has been an important topic of discussion in the
IoT regulation context. Many agencies, including the FTC and
NTIA, have been strong proponents of patchability as a requirement
for responsible IoT manufacturing.275 Patching is a substantial part
273

See Erik Stallman, The Current DMCA Exemption Process Is a Computer
Security Vulnerability, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY (Jan. 21,
2015), https://cdt.org/blog/the-current-dmca-exemption-process-is-a-computersecurity-vulnerability (also arguing that security research may take more than
three years, in which the exemption is in force).
274

See Mauricio Paez & Mike La Marca, The Internet of Things: Emerging Legal
Issues for Businesses, 43 N. KY. L. REV. 29, 53 (2016) (“[M]anufacturers often
lack an economic incentive to provide software updates and support:
manufacturers of specialized computer chips, which are cheap and operate on a
thin profit margin, are typically working on or shipping the next version of the
chip, while the original device manufacturers-who often do not get their brand
name on the finished product-are working to upgrade their product to support the
new chip. In this mindset, where getting the product to the market is the
overwhelming priority, security may not be a priority.”).
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of overall security, but it is by no means a magic solution. Many
users do not patch their software (if given a choice); certain
organizations, such as hospitals and power plants, cannot patch
immediately due to concerns that the patch may create functionality
problems; and patches often have flaws themselves.276
e. Privacy Tort Law Solutions
Allowing individual hackers to perform security research
may put privacy at risk should researchers encounter sensitive
private information.277 Users whose private information is
compromised or disseminated to the public should have legal
recourse. In this context, privacy tort law may provide a partial
remedy for informational harms caused by security research, even
in cases where the private information is not otherwise protected by
data protection laws.278 Recent literature focuses on two torts –
intrusion upon seclusion and publicity given to private life.279
So far, courts have largely dismissed data breach lawsuits by
consumers against vendors, ruling that if consumers do not suffer
quantifiable harm, there is no legal cause of action.280 These,
however, are lawsuits against vendors; courts may reach a different
conclusion if the defendant is a security researcher who overstepped
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2017),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/otherpublication/2016/multistakeholder-process-iot-security.
276

See Kesan & Hayes, supra note 73, at 787.

277

Some guidance could be provided by laws dealing with the protection of
certain types of information. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.306 (Health Insurance
Portability and Accessibility Act – HIPAA) (providing the security standards for
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(ADVISEN)
(2010),
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the boundaries of his or her specific research, though proving harm
will still be a necessary component.281
f. Vulnerability Disclosure Procedure
The process by which vulnerabilities are disclosed has been
a contentious topic in recent years.282 Vulnerability disclosure283 is
essentially a double-edged sword; the benefits extracted from it are
largely dependent on the methods of disclosure, including the parties
who learn about it and what they decide to do with that
information.284 Intuition suggests that once security researchers
identify a vulnerability, they should disclose it to the relevant party,
who would in turn fix or patch the flaw, thereby enhancing the
overall security of the software. In the words of then-Secretary of
Defense Ash Carter this would be the equivalent of a “‘see
something, say something’ policy for the digital domain.”285
Reality, however, has been slightly more complicated than that.
While disclosing vulnerabilities to the vendor was the norm
for many years, security researchers became increasingly frustrated
because they were often ignored by vendors, who were reluctant
281
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(Nov.
15,
2016),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Se
curing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-FINAL....pdf
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that
“[w]hile there is not yet an established body of case law addressing IoT context,
traditional tort principles of product liability can be expected to apply.”).
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Susan Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of
Ideas and Data be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L. J. SCI. & TECH. 101, 237 (2003)
(arguing that the controversy about vulnerability disclosure is over how the
information is disseminated).
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See Williams, Pescatore, and Proctor, Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure:
Guidance for Researchers, Vendors, and End Users, at 3, GARTNER (Oct. 17,
2016),
http://attrition.org/misc/ee/gartner-responsible_disclosure-144061.pdf
(“Publicity over vulnerabilities in software products is a double-edged sword.
Making vulnerabilities public has, unfortunately, proved necessary to spur some
software vendors to invest in better software development, patch production and
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investigate reported vulnerabilities.286 At that point, researchers
published only very limited information about the existence of a
vulnerability to the public, which resulted in some vendors claiming
these vulnerabilities were “theoretical.”287 Only when security
researchers finally published the information they had to the public
in full did vendors start taking these matters seriously.288 This has
led to a fragmentation of the philosophy on vulnerability disclosure.
While certain experts advocate for “responsible disclosure,” which
primarily focuses on disclosing vulnerabilities to the vendor, there
is a strong group of experts who oppose that approach and argue for
“full disclosure,” encouraging security researchers to publish the
flaws they have identified to the broader public and assuming the
vendor will then be pressured to fix the flaw more promptly.289
There is a substantial group of individuals and organizations who
adopt the “nondisclosure” approach to vulnerabilities, mainly black
hats and intelligence agencies such as the National Security
Agency.290
i.

Responsible Disclosure

Responsible disclosure typically refers to reporting a
vulnerability to the relevant vendor and allowing the vendor a
certain amount of time to fix the vulnerability, depending on its
complexity and other circumstances.291 This type of disclosure is the
286

See Bruce Schneier, Schneier: Full Disclosure of Security Vulnerabilities a
‘Damned Good Idea’, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 2007),
https://www.schneier.com/essays/archives/2007/01/schneier_full_disclo.html.
287

See Schneier, supra note 286.
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289

Edward Freeman, Vulnerability Disclosure: The Strange Case of Bret
McDanel, 16 INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY 127, 128 (2007).
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See Bruce Schneier, The NSA Is Hoarding Vulnerabilities, SCHNEIER ON
SECURITY
(Aug.
26,
2016),
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/08/the_nsa_is_hoar.html
(explaining how the NSA is hoarding vulnerabilities of software used both by
private and governmental entities, including companies like Cisco, Fortinet,
TOPSEC, and more. A portion of these vulnerabilities was patched since, but
some vulnerabilities were still unknown until a group named Shadow Brokers
leaked 300 megabytes worth of NSA-hoarded vulnerabilities).
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See Marc Laliberte, A Look Inside Responsible Vulnerability Disclosure, DARK
READING (Jan. 5, 2017), http://www.darkreading.com/threat-intelligence/a-lookinside-responsible-vulnerability-disclosure/a/d-id/1327800 (“First, the researcher
identifies a security vulnerability and its potential impact . . . . Next, the researcher
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most commonly used approach by vendors, who naturally prefer to
learn about the vulnerability before other parties or the public.292
Initially, the DMCA exemption for security research was expected
to include a requirement of responsible disclosure as part of its goodfaith term. However, the Librarian of Congress noted that the
community was divided on what constituted responsible disclosure
and that therefore the DMCA rulemaking did not require
responsible, or any other, type of disclosure other than requiring that
information gathered be used primarily “to promote the security or
safety” of the device in question.293
This is not to say that the public will not learn about the
vulnerability; rather, such information will be released to the public
only once a patch is released and the risk of exploitation by third
creates a vulnerability advisory report including a detailed description of the
vulnerability, supporting evidence, and a full disclosure timeline . . . . After
submitting the advisory to the vendor, the researcher typically allows the vendor
a reasonable amount of time to investigate and fix the exploit . . . . Finally, once
a patch is available or the disclosure timeline (including any extensions) has
elapsed, the researcher publishes a full disclosure analysis of the vulnerability.”).
292
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http://www.cert.org/vulnerability-analysis/vul-disclosure.cfm? (providing that
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report, regardless of the existence or available of patches”). See also Chris Evans
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GOOGLE
SECURITY
BLOG
(May
29,
2013),
https://security.googleblog.com/2013/05/disclosure-timeline-forvulnerabilities.html (“Our standing recommendation is that companies should fix
critical vulnerabilities within 60 days—or, if a fix is not possible, they should
notify the public about the risk and offer workarounds.”).
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80 FR 65944, 65956 (Oct. 28, 2015) (“As explained above, a significant issue
with respect to the security exemptions involves the proper disclosure of security
research findings, as the interests of the manufacturer and the public may both be
affected by the nature and timing of disclosure of software flaws. Indeed,
Congress included disclosure to the system developer as one of the factors to be
considered in determining a person's eligibility for the security testing exemption
in section 1201(j). Although the Register expressed support for responsible
disclosure of security flaws, she acknowledged the difficulty of attempting to
define disclosure standards in the context of this rulemaking, as opinions seem
sharply divided on this point. Accordingly, rather than incorporating an express
disclosure rule, the recommended exemption draws upon what the Register
perceives to be the basic intent of section 1201(j) by specifying that the
information derived from the research activity be used primarily to promote the
security or safety of the devices containing the computer programs on which the
research is conducted, or of those who use those devices.”).
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parties decreases.294 Another variation of responsible disclosure is
reporting all information regarding the vulnerability to the vendor
while disclosing only limited information, excluding the proof of
concept, to the public.295 However, even that approach does not
necessarily prevent malicious hackers from reverse-engineering the
general vulnerability information that is provided to the public.296
The general idea is to ensure that the public will not be able to
directly use the information to exploit the vulnerability.
ii. Full Disclosure
Full disclosure, unlike responsible disclosure, is the practice
of reporting a vulnerability to the public to the fullest extent possible
and without informing the vendor of it beforehand.297 The practice
of full disclosure is evidence of some of the frustration of the
security research community resulting from vendors sometimes
ignoring vulnerabilities reported to them.298 It is immensely
controversial because it allows equal access to information about a
vulnerability to vendors and to potential exploiters.299 The idea
behind full disclosure is to pressure the vendor to patch the
vulnerability since public scrutiny is a strong motivation for vendors
294
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(Oct.
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in Software Vulnerabilities, 28 J. COMP. & INF. L. 451, 483 (2011) (“[A] full
disclosure occurs where independent security analysts promptly post
vulnerabilities to a public listing.”).
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23,
2007),
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to take security seriously.300 Bruce Schneier, a supporter of the full
disclosure practice, called it a “damned good idea,” 301 and many
others agree.
However, full disclosure is not always a provocative step
against vendors. It is often used to publish information about a
vulnerability so that customers can protect themselves from
exploitation, given that the vendor will either ignore or take too long
to fix the flaw. Many assume that full disclosure allows malicious
actors to exploit vulnerabilities published by security researchers,
but there is an assumption that black-hat hackers are aware of certain
vulnerabilities, if not sold them in the zero-day vulnerability
market.302
iii.

The Road Forward on Vulnerability Disclosure

This subsection has demonstrated that the debate over
vulnerability disclosure stems from distrust between security
researchers and vendors.303 But security researchers could regain
their trust in vendors, and vice versa, if a robust form of oversight is
implemented. This can be achieved by relying on intermediaries and
enforcers of norms in that context – for example, US-CERT and the
FTC. Primarily, this will require official guidelines from an
authoritative body (the FTC, for example) regarding how to
responsibly disclose vulnerabilities in a way that properly balances
vendors’ interests and the need for cybersecurity.
g. Transnational Law Enforcement and Reducing
National Security Threats

300
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NTIA
Awareness
and
Adoption
Group,
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sclosure_insights_report.pdf (“The assumptions and prejudices that impede
collaboration between researchers and technology providers may be based on past
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The DOJ recently indicted a group of Russian FSB officers
who were involved in hacking Yahoo!, gaining access to as many as
500 million e-mail accounts.304 Transnational law enforcement is
expensive and resource-intensive. In an environment friendlier to
ethical hacking, where tech companies do not threaten security
researchers, such a massive data breach could have been prevented.
In addition, the FBI has already admitted that it is losing the “war
on hackers,”305 which indicates that law enforcement may be
increasingly inclined to consider “alternative architectures that are
more secure” in the first place.306
Patching vulnerabilities before foreign governments learn
about them could enhance overall national security. If we assume
that national security includes dams, transportation, healthcare, and
other sectors operating on information technology, we might also
conclude that patching vulnerabilities in advance would keep
foreign malicious actors largely at bay, since their options to attack
the cyber infrastructure would be limited to only zero-day
vulnerabilities, which would be far more limited than the number of
vulnerabilities that could be identified by ethical hackers and
patched by the manufacturer.
h. Tackling Security by Obscurity
The concept of security by obscurity provides that keeping the
code for a particular piece of software, and therefore vulnerabilities
in that code, hidden and unknown to hackers can make the software
seemingly more secure.307 In software engineering, this is
304
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sometimes called “obfuscation.”308 Vendors may make their code
overly complex or ridden with gibberish code lines in order to
confuse a potential attacker. But this has not worked in the past, and
it will not work in the future. In today’s cybersecurity world, it is
almost impossible to hide vulnerabilities; the only way to prevent
their exploitation is to patch them and get rid of them.309 Security by
obscurity also violates Kerckhoff’s principle,310 which posits that
the public release of a system should not be to its detriment, since
systems should be secure by design, not due to their confusing
nature.311
This shows that the emphasis on securing IoT devices should be
on revealing vulnerabilities, possibly providing an incentive for
individuals to do so, as well as on patching those vulnerabilities,
which is the responsibility of the vendor.
In this regard, the FTC can play an important role. The FTC has
been recently actively enforcing consumer privacy based on Section
308
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5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”312 The FTC
has become a “de facto data protection authority.”313 Given that the
degree of privacy could be affected by the strength of security, the
FTC ought to ensure that companies do not engage in practices that
could compromise private information belonging to consumers,
with security by obscurity being one of those practices.314
Furthermore, the Third Circuit in FTC v. Wyndham held that the
FTC has authority to sue for inadequate security practices.315
This common law of FTC privacy enforcement could lead to
stronger enforcement against companies who do not act according
to industry best practices of privacy and security. 316 Security by
obscurity, a practice that certain vendors adopt in order to avoid
vulnerability detection, should be treated as a deceptive or unfair
practice in the same way the FTC deals with other security-violating
practices.317 The FTC has already pursued action against an IoT
vendor, TRENDnet, in a claim that its smart webcams did not
provide consumers with “reasonable security to prevent
unauthorized access to sensitive information, namely the live feeds
from the IP cameras.”318 It is anticipated that the FTC will pursue
further enforcement against IoT vendors who engage in unfair or
deceptive security or privacy practices, which should encompass
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practices like security by obscurity and, perhaps, unwillingness to
respond to vulnerability disclosures.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article argues that the DMCA and CFAA impede security
research into software vulnerabilities, which are on the rise in the
emerging IoT ecosystem due to an industry-specific market failure.
These legal barriers discourage security researchers from
discovering flaws and reporting them to the relevant vendors, which
would enhance overall privacy and security. This could be partially
resolved by mitigating the threat of legal jeopardy through
clarification of the DMCA and CFAA boundaries as well as by
enacting legal and regulatory adaptations such as requiring
patchability in IoT, tackling security by obscurity, and enforcing the
law against noncomplying vendors. This will create a friendly and
fruitful environment for security research, leading to a more secure
IoT ecosystem and, ultimately, a more secure Internet system.
The IoT ecosystem creates a host of opportunities but also a
variety of risks and dangers, which should be addressed through
legitimizing the activities of the community of dedicated
vulnerability hunters. Security research is important where market
forces fail and where vendors are unlikely to discover vulnerabilities
on their own, which they currently lack the incentive to do. Broad
interpretation of these “anti-hacking” laws is resulting in a less
secure Internet, and the stakes are constantly increasing given the
ubiquity of sensors and physicality of the IoT ecosystem.
The law should clearly distinguish between white- and gray-hat
hackers, whose purpose is to fix flaws (to varying degrees), and
black-hat hackers, who use vulnerabilities for criminal ends. This
distinction has been overlooked for too long, and IoT ought to be a
turning point in that regard, creating a space for benevolent actors
to fully utilize their talent.
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